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Abstract 
 
This dissertation examines hypocognition, a phenomenon in which people lack cognitive 
or linguistic representations of concepts to describe ideas or interpret experiences. Chapter 1 
presents a theoretical review of hypocognition and its implications for perception, affect, and 
behavior. Drawing from the cross-cultural and expertise literatures, I describe how 
hypocognition impoverishes one’s mental world, leaving cognitive deficits in recognition, 
explanation, and remembering while fueling cultural chauvinism and social conflict. Chapter 2 
empirically demonstrates the cognitive consequences of hypocognition. In six studies, I show 
how hypocognition degrades identification, recognition, and memory of fundamental 
information in one’s living environment. Chapter 3 explores the social implications of 
hypocognition. Eight studies point to hypocognition as a cognitive blind spot underlying the 
invisibility of one’s social privilege and denial of discrimination. Chapter 4 discusses future 
directions and explores whether hypocognition can be motivated, where it originates, and its 
implications with regard to public health and sustainability. I end with a caution against going 
too far to reduce hypocognition and risking its opposite, hypercognition––overapplying a 
familiar concept to circumstances where it does not belong.   
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Chapter 1 Introduction to Hypocognition 
 
In 1806, entrepreneur Frederic Tudor sailed to the island of Martinique with a precious 
cargo. He had harvested ice from frozen Massachusetts rivers and expected to make a tidy profit 
selling it to tropical customers. There was only one problem: the islanders had never seen ice. 
They had never experienced a cold drink, never tasted a pint of ice cream. Refrigeration was not 
a celebrated innovation, but an unknown concept. In their eyes, there was no value in Tudor’s 
cargo. His sizable investment melted away unappreciated and unsold in the Caribbean heat 
(Weightman, 2003).  
Tudor’s ice tale contains an important point about human affairs. Often, human fate rests 
not on what people know but what they fail to know. Often, life’s outcomes are determined by 
hypocognition.  
What is hypocognition? If you don’t know, you’ve just experienced it. 
Hypocognition, a term introduced to modern behavioral science by anthropologist Robert 
Levy, means the lack of a linguistic or cognitive representation for an object, category, or idea 
(R. I. Levy, 1973; Wu & Dunning, 2018a, 2018b). The Martinique islanders were hypocognitive 
because they lacked a cognitive representation of refrigeration. But so are we hypocognitive of 
the numerous concepts that elude our awareness. We wander about the unknown terrains of life 
as novices more often than experts, complacent about what we know and oblivious to what we 
miss.  
In financial dealings, almost two-thirds of Americans are hypocognitive of compound 
interest, unaware of how much saving money can benefit them and how quickly debt can crush 
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them (Lin J. et al., 2016). In health, a full third of people suffering from Type II diabetes remain 
hypocognitive of the illness. They fail to seek needed treatment—despite recognizing blurry 
vision, dry mouth, frequent urination—because they lack the underlying concept that would 
unify the disparate warning signals into a single alarm (Cowie et al., 2006). In keeping up with 
sustainable living, people buy food more in line with their environmental preferences only after 
the conceptual distinction between sun- and oil-based foods is made clear to them (Lakoff, 
2010). 
People’s finite conceptual horizons are a pervasive and powerful constraint on how they 
make sense of the world. These horizons represent the hard boundaries of where people’s 
possible interpretation of their circumstances can go and define the finite channels into which 
their understanding is funneled. To be sure, what each individual person knows is considerable, 
but it pales against the entire landscape of concepts that are possible to know. The typical 20-
year-old English speaker knows the equivalent of 42,000 dictionary entries, with the number 
rising to 48,000 by age 60 (Brysbaert, Stevens, Mandera, & Keuleers, 2016). Webster’s Third 
New International Dictionary, however, contains roughly 470,000 entries; the second edition of 
the Oxford English Dictionary contains over 600,000. Add to that concepts from other languages 
that fail to translate to English: A recent emotion lexicography listed 216 untranslatable words 
related just to the concept of “well-being” from non-English languages (Lomas, 2016). Thus, 
what each individual knows is merely a narrow slice of concepts, ideas, and analyses that 
humanity has developed to comprehend the world that they inhabit. 
Hypocognition, a concept with a robust intellectual life in linguistics and anthropology, 
has much to say about psychological life. If people base their interpretations of circumstances 
and situations upon readily available cognitive frameworks (Park, 2010), the frameworks one 
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does not have limit the scope of which understandings are possible. Hence, making sense of how 
people make sense of the world entails knowing the possible interpretations not available to 
them. In this theoretical overview, I explore how hypocognition affects meaning construction 
and steers thought and action as people navigate their social worlds. I detail the social and 
cognitive consequences of being hypocognitive and describe the phenomenology of people 
afflicted with hypocognition.  
History and Relevance to Psychology 
The notion of hypocognition was introduced to modern behavioral science by the 
anthropologist Robert Levy (1973) in his classic field study of the Society Islands in Tahiti. Levy 
documented a peculiar observation: Tahitians expressed no grief when they suffered the loss of a 
loved one. They fell sick. They sensed strangeness. Yet, they could not articulate grief, because 
they had no concept of grief in the first place. Tahitians, in their reckoning of love and loss and 
their wrestling with death and darkness, suffered not from grief, but a hypocognition of grief.  
With regard to psychological functioning, I take being hypocognitive as the absence of 
being schematic for a concept (Neisser, 1976). As traditionally defined, schemata are knowledge 
structures that represent, organize, and make sense of the features of people, places, objects, and 
events encountered by the social perceiver. Schemata contain not only the features needed to 
identify an instance of an object, but also all its associations to other ideas, events, and actions to 
which the concept may be relevant (Minsky, 1975; Rumelhart, 1981). That is, the schema 
contains elaborations detailing how a concept connects to other concepts a person may possess. 
For example, a schema for psychological stress may contain not only the symptoms needed to 
recognize stress, but also ideas about what causes or explains stress, what stress may cause in 
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turn, and common responses for managing or reducing it. To be hypocognitive about 
psychological stress would be to have none or only a sparse collection of these associations.  
Examples of Hypocognition 
To be sure, people may still experience some fragmentary or vague aspects of the 
concepts of which they are hypocognitive, such as Levy’s (1973) Tahitians who felt diffuse 
somatic signs of sickness or strangeness when experiencing grief. Even the two-dimensional 
beings in Flatland can experience spheres as expanding and contracting circles as the spheres 
pass through their two-dimensional world. Either group, however, will not attain the full 
experience of the concept or connect it to other concepts. Rather, they come away with a crude 
understanding and an impoverished experience of the concept.  
In the behavioral science literature, one sees evidence for impoverished experience 
among the hypocognitive. What they see in an instance of a concept—if they see it at all—is 
different from what people more familiar and knowledgeable with the concept see or experience. 
Examples come from two different areas of psychology. 
The Psychology of Expertise 
Identifying instances. What novice sees is often quite different from what an expert 
experiences (M. Chi, 2006). Novices lack meaningful schemata to aid recognizing instances of a 
category and thus miss things. For example, novice physicians are not as good at identifying 
abnormalities in lung X-rays as their more knowledgeable counterparts. They recognize three 
fewer findings per film, miss more subtle cues of pathology, and notice fewer relationships 
among those cues (Lesgold et al., 1988). Similarly, although novice physicians were equally 
good at seeing key events on a record of physiological function as experts, they saw fewer 
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secondary events and were less successful distinguishing clinically relevant readings from simple 
artifacts (Alberdi et al., 2001). 
In addition, when interpreting a situation, novices lack the penumbra of background 
associations that experts connect to their experiences. Novices see only that which is explicitly 
there, that is, the exogenous properties of a stimulus. In physics, for example, novices fail to 
recognize the deep structure inherent in physics problems—the representation most relevant to 
problem-solving (M. T. H. Chi, Feltovich, & Glaser, 1981; Fincher-Kiefer, Post, Greene, & 
Voss, 1988). Given a selection of problems and asked to group them, novices—hypocognitive to 
underlying concepts—sort them based on more superficial features, such as whether the problem 
involves pulleys or inclined planes. Experts will sort the problems according to underlying 
principles of physics that the problems suggest, such as conservation of energy. That is, they 
bring crucial endogenous associations to the task, associations generated internally upon seeing 
the stimulus. This discrepancy is also seen in medicine (Groen & Patel, 1988), engineering 
(Moss, Kotovsky, & Cagan, 2006), and mathematics (Silver, 1979).  
Further, when trying to identify and distinguish letters from the Arabic alphabet, novices 
fail to have access to non-visual, endogenous associations that experts bring to bear in 
recognition and interpretation, such as the brushstrokes needed to create the letters as well as 
their meaning and sound. Novices see only the exogenous, physical characteristics of the letters. 
Thus, when making judgments about whether pairs of letters are identical, novices are slower 
and less accurate than their more expert peers, and 50% of the difference in speed and 10% of 
that in accuracy are explained by non-visual associations available to experts but not to novices 
(Wiley, Wilson, & Rapp, 2016). 
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Memory. Missing those schematic associations also prompts novices to have worse 
memory than experts. Chess novices recall non-random positions of chess pieces at a rate only 
one-fourth of that of experts (Chase & Simon, 1973). Novice baseball fans recall fewer balls and 
strikes after listening to a baseball game than do experts, because they lack the schemata to aid 
their memory (Chiesi, Spilich, & Voss, 1979). Likewise, novices to air flight recall air traffic 
control recall messages less accurately than do expert pilots (Morrow, Menard, Stine-Morrow, 
Teller, & Bryant, 2001).  
Cross-cultural psychology 
Examples of hypocognition abound in cross-cultural psychology as well. Different 
cultures often bring disparate notions to their interpretation of the same situation. What they 
experience, therefore, can be quite different. 
Color. The ability to distinguish between shades of blue depends on the underlying 
linguistic representation of colors that one’s language affords. Whereas English has one generic 
concept for the color blue, distinct linguistic representations of light versus dark blue exist in 
Russian (goluboy versus siniy; Winawer et al., 2007), Greek (ghalazio versus ble; Thierry, 
Athanasopoulos, Wiggett, Dering, & Kuipers, 2009), Turkish (mavi versus lacivert; Özgen & 
Davies, 1998), Korean (yeondu versus chorok; Roberson, Pak, & Hanley, 2008), and Japanese 
(ao versus mizuiro; Athanasopoulos, Damjanovic, Krajciova, & Sasaki, 2011). Deprived of these 
finer-grained color concepts, native English speakers are not only slower, but less accurate, at 
discerning different shades of blue than speakers of languages with more granular linguistic 
distinctions (Winawer et al., 2007).  
Nonetheless, English speakers can perceive differences among broader color categories 
(e.g., blue versus green) not apparent to other cultural groups. English has 11 basic color terms. 
 7 
Others, such as the Berinmo hunter-gathers in Papua New Guinea or the Himba nomads in 
southern Africa, have only five. The objective vision of the Berinmo and the Himba is just as 
good as that among English speakers; however, they show poorer perceptual judgment and more 
memory confusion for colors that English-speakers place into distinct categories (Davidoff, 
Davies, & Roberson, 1999; Roberson, Davies, & Davidoff, 2000).  
Numbers. Cultures also vary widely in the degree to which they are hypocognitive of 
numerical representations. On one end of the spectrum, the Pirahã tribe of Amazonia have only a 
“one-two-many” counting system. Unable to entertain numerical concepts beyond two, the 
Pirahã fail to enumerate exact numbers of three items or more (Gordon, 2004). They can 
recognize which bundles of objects are more numerous, but fail to recall which bundle is larger 
once removed from sight (Frank, Everett, Fedorenko, & Gibson, 2008).  
Emotion. People experience emotions as situated conceptualizations within the bounds 
of their knowledge (Barrett, 2006). Just as the Tahitians suffer from hypocognition of sorrow (R. 
I. Levy, 1973), Ilongots of the Philippines (Rosaldo, 1980) and the Pintupi of aboriginal 
Australians (Morice, 1978) cannot elucidate feelings of guilt; the Kaluli of Papua New Guinea 
(Schieffelin, 2005) and the Xhosa of South Africa (Cheetham & Cheetham R.J., 1976) fail to 
articulate feelings of depression; and the Machiguenga of Peru (Johnson, Johnson, & Baksh, 
1986) lack the lexicon for anxiety.  
English speakers are of no exception. They may have an approximate sense of liget 
(Ilongot) as anger, but not fully capture the subtleties and elaborations it entails, such as 
exuberance in aggressive acts and in the perspiration of hard work. They may come to 
understand lajja (Odia) as feelings of shame, but miss the totality of its meaning as manifested 
through self-control, moral responsibility, and social hierarchy (Parish, 1991). They may 
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understand grief, but have little understanding for mo’emo’e, or feelings of loneliness tinged with 
a “sense of the uncanny” commonly felt among Tahitians (R. I. Levy, 1973). Hypocognitive of 
the emotions as felt by cultural insiders, people cannot fully appreciate the richness of emotional 
terrains foreign to their own (Wierzbicka, 1999).  
One distinct example is the concept of amae, the ability to “depend and presume upon 
another’s love or bask in another’s indulgence.” Amae has no linguistic equivalent in non-
Japanese cultures (Doi, 1992). As best translated, it refers to a pleasant emotion elicited when 
someone makes an inappropriate request of another individual. Both the person making and the 
one receiving the request feel the emotion, but the latter is more likely to experience a greater 
sense of amae because they recognize the inappropriate nature of the demand being asked. 
Although amae can be experienced to some extent (e.g., asking a cousin to help with a paper, 
knowing he has his own exam to study for; Niiya, Ellsworth, & Yamaguchi, 2006) or partially 
captured by close equivalents (“mardy”; Lewis & Ozaki, 2009), non-Japanese-natives are 
nonetheless hypocognitive of its many facets and nuances in meaning.  
Qualitative research highlights its complex nature. Consider the following account by a 
Japanese woman about her male acquaintance’s wife: One day, the wife begged for her help in 
translating a letter into English. Despite the woman’s reluctance, the wife further insisted that the 
woman make a trip to her house and bring the letter in person. “Well, it turned out that the letter 
she wrote was a love letter for someone whom she's having an affair with,” said the Japanese 
woman with little surprise. “It was definitely amae because somehow, even though she knew that 
I knew her husband, she expected that I wouldn't tell him about her affair” (Behrens, 2004, p. 
21).  
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To foreign ears, such intricacies in relationship entanglement and expected dependency 
may sound befuddling, strange, or pathological: Why would the wife not simply ask someone 
else to conduct the translation? Yet, to Japanese listeners fluent with amae, the wife’s action 
speaks volumes: by presuming the woman’s loyalty and confidence, the dallying wife indulges in 
their mutual secrecy, fosters a closer bonding, and reinforces social harmony (B. Bower, 2004).  
Overview 
The above chapter provided a theoretical overview of hypocognition adapted from my 
original paper “Hypocognition: Making sense of the landscape beyond one’s conceptual reach” 
(Wu & Dunning, 2018a) and article “Unknown unknowns: The problem of hypocognition” (Wu 
& Dunning, 2018b). Subsequent chapters in this dissertation include empirical studies explore 
the cognitive and social consequences of hypocognition (Chapters 2 and 3) and a discussion of 
future directions (Chapter 4).  
Chapter 2 empirically demonstrates the cognitive consequences of hypocognition. Six 
studies revealed that hypocognition degrades retention of fundamental information in everyday 
living. Hypocognitive participants reported encountering instances of a concept less often than 
those who knew the concept (Study 1). They failed to discern the presence and encode the 
frequency of objects for which they were hypocognitive, such as American participants when 
observing exotic fruits (Studies 2A & 3) and alphabetic letters rendered as unfamiliar symbols 
(Studies 2B & 5). Hypocognition occurs across cultures: British participants tracked the 
frequency of Asian dumplings less accurately than Chinese participants, who tracked the 
frequency of cheese less accurately than the British (Study 4). Lacking an underlying concept 
impedes remembering even when verbal labels are present (Study 5). Finite channels of 
conceptual knowledge impose a powerful constraint on what people identify, recognize, and 
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remember in their everyday environment. The concepts that people lack impoverish their 
experience with the world (Wu & Dunning, 2019).  
Chapter 3 explores the social consequences of hypocognition. The U.S. faces deep social 
divides, with socially dominant group members failing to acknowledge privilege and minimizing 
the hardships that subordinate groups endure. In 8 studies, I explore hypocognition as a cognitive 
factor underlying the invisibility of social privilege. I argue that advantaged social groups suffer 
from hypocognition, in which people fail to have a cognitive representation of privilege and have 
little of the cognitive architecture needed to recognize the disadvantages experienced by non-
privileged groups. Right-handers generated fewer handedness-related hassles relative to left-
handers (Study 1). Men, compared to women, generated fewer instances of gender 
discrimination, recalled fewer items of self-protection against assault from a presented list, and 
showed poorer recall and recognition of gender discrimination examples from a video (Studies 
2a-2c). Whites, relative to Blacks, generated fewer racial discrimination instances and recalled 
fewer such instances from a presented list (Studies 3a-3b). Whites also generated fewer racial 
discrimination instances and reacted more slowly to discriminatory behavior relative to Asians 
(Study 4). Hypocognition, in turn, predicted group asymmetries in attitudes regarding 
acknowledging social privilege and stating that discrimination still exists. Study 5 tested an 
intervention to reduce hypocognition. After watching a TEDx talk in which a transgender woman 
described her discrimination experience living as female and acknowledged the male privilege 
she once had, both men and women showed increased awareness of male privilege and gender 
discrimination. Findings suggest that the invisibility of one’s own social privilege need not solely 
reflect identity-defensive motivations, but may also stem from cognitive deficits blinding the 
socially privileged to inconveniences they do not experience (Wu & Dunning, 2020).  
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Chapter 4 explores future directions and discusses whether hypocognition can be 
motivated, where it originates, its implications with regard to public health and sustainability, 
and its opposite, hypercognition (i.e., overapplying a familiar concept to circumstances where it 
does not belong). This chapter is in part adapted from my article “Hypocognition is a censorship 
tool that mutes what we can feel” (Wu, 2020). 
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Chapter 2 Cognitive Consequences: How Hypocognition Confines Perception and Memory 
 
Show Americans an apple––they experience it not as a mottled red blob with a hard 
surface, but immediately as an apple. They know without effort that an apple crunches, tastes 
sweet, can be baked into a pie, and grows on trees. It is an instance of a category for which they 
possess rich conceptual knowledge (Grill-Spector & Kanwisher, 2005). However, a durian—a 
fruit common in Southeast Asia—evokes no such cognitive or linguistic representation. It is 
experienced as no more than a yellow, thorny, aromatic oddity evoking no conceptual knowledge 
to guide its identification.  
The impoverished experience of a durian reflects an instance of hypocognition, a state in 
which people lack a cognitive or linguistic representation of a concept, category, or idea (Wu & 
Dunning, 2018a, 2018b). To be hypocognitive of an object is to lack its conceptual knowledge, 
which can include its name, defining features, and importantly, all associations surrounding it.  
Memory for Instances of Encounter 
In this chapter, I examine whether hypocognition, or lack of conceptual knowledge, has 
an impact on what people retain in memory, and in particular, the deficits in memory for 
instances and frequency of encounter. I focus on these cognitive consequences not only because 
they are fundamental tasks of remembering, but also because memory for frequency of encounter 
has been shown to be a generally robust skill. Retaining information about events and objects of 
encounter, and in particular noting how frequently they appear in the environment, is a skill 
where people show consummate performance, even when it is not a task they have been 
explicitly asked to do (Hasher & Chromiak, 1977; Hasher & Zacks, 1979, 1984). Moreover, 
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memory for frequency has been shown to be resilient against variables that should degrade it. 
People’s accuracy at registering frequency of encounter withstands individual variations in age, 
education, individual differences in ability, or cognitive functioning. It is also not influenced by 
recency or duration of presentation, practice at task, feedback about performance, explicit 
instructions to track frequency, the express intent to do so, or whether the task instruction 
involves gist versus verbatim memory (Hasher & Zacks, 1984; Zacks & Hasher, 2002).   
I hypothesize that hypocognition would degrade people’s performance at identifying 
objects of encounter and the frequency with which they had encountered them. To remember 
instances of encounter with an object, one has to have the conceptual knowledge of what the 
object is in the first place. Otherwise, one remains hypocognitive and will show deficit in 
registering the presence or tracking the frequency of an instance or object, regardless of how 
robust these skills may be in general. This idea is reminiscent of Bartlett’s (1932) classic work 
on memory reconstruction, in which he had British participants read and retell a Canadian 
aboriginal legend about a war of the ghosts to a new set of participants, who then reproduced the 
legend for another set of participants, and so on. Retellings of the legend showed distortions of 
input materials into details consistent with the schema British participants had, as well as 
omissions of schema-inconsistent details that were culturally unfamiliar (for more recent 
research questioning these classic observations, see Kintsch & Greene, 1978; Mandler & 
Johnson, 1977; Zangwill, 1972). It is also reminiscent of classic social cognitive work on 
schematic processing (Minsky, 1975; Rumelhart, 1981; Schank & Abelson, 1977), in that having 
conceptual knowledge (i.e., a schematic knowledge structure of a concept or category) influences 
cognitive performance. However, unlike classic work, which focused primarily on how schema 
inspired intrusions, distortions, and mistakes in memory (J. B. Black, Turner, & Bower, 1979; 
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Brewer & Treyens, 1981), I emphasize how having conceptual knowledge is crucial for 
promoting accuracy in retention of basic information about the environment.  
Distinguishing Hypocognition from Related Notions 
In defining the term hypocognition, I also clarify what it is not. By hypocognition, I refer 
to a paucity of conceptual knowledge of and associations to a category. I do not mean simply 
failing to have a name or label for it. The name of a category is part of conceptual knowledge, 
not a substitution of conceptual knowledge. To be told of the name of the Japanese emotion 
amae is to know something about the concept, but it does not mean that someone understands the 
emotion to the full and nuanced extent a person from Japan might.  
As such, I distinguish hypocognition from other linguistic notions. Some readers may 
associate this discussion of hypocognition with the linguistic relativity hypothesis (Whorf, 1956). 
However, whereas the linguistic relativity hypothesis focuses on how language constrains human 
thought, I aim to show how deficits in cognitive representations––which can take place 
independent of language––affect identification, recognition, and retention of information. 
Hypocognition speaks to a deficit in conceptual knowledge rather than a poverty of words.  
Hypocognition is not the mere absence of a verbal label. Knowing a label may help facilitate 
knowledge of a category, but the two processes do not entirely overlap (Lupyan, 2008). Humans 
and animals have been shown to acquire and have concepts even in the absence of verbal 
labeling (Astley & Wasserman, 1998; Druks & Shallice, 2000; Zentall, Wasserman, & Urcuioli, 
2014).  
Overview of Studies 
In six studies, I examined the cognitive consequences of hypocognition for retaining 
information of encounter and its frequency. I hypothesize that people who are hypocognitive 
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would show greater errors in reporting whether they have encountered a phenomenon or object 
(Studies 1-2) and how many times they have encountered it (Studies 3-5). In particular, 
participants who lacked familiarity with a concept would report encountering fewer instances of 
it in their daily environment (Study 1). They would less accurately recognize the presence versus 
absence of an object of which they are hypocognitive, compared to objects for which they have 
conceptual knowledge (Studies 2A-2B).  
In addition, what participants retained in memory would differ based on cultural 
experience. Participants would commit more errors in tracking the frequency of objects absent or 
rare in their cultural experience, relative to more culturally familiar ones (Studies 3-4).  
Finally, Study 5 disentangled the effects of hypocognition (lacking conceptual 
knowledge) from any effects due to simply lacking a label for a category. I predict that lacking 
conceptual knowledge would impair frequency encoding even when verbal labeling is present. 
That is, having a label for an object may aid remembering to some extent (Lupyan, 2008), but 
not as much as having full conceptual knowledge attached to the object. 
Study 1: Conceptual Knowledge and Reports of Encounter 
I first explored a general question: Is there a relationship between lacking conceptual 
knowledge and failures to recall instances of experiencing it? I predicted that participants who 
were hypocognitive would report fewer encounters with instances of a concept over the past two 
weeks compared to participants who knew the concept. Participants were asked to review their 
last two weeks to report how many times they had encountered many types of experiences 
involving concepts that they may or may not have previously known. Some of the concepts were 
abstract or academic in nature (e.g., benevolent sexism, experiencing sexism that is framed as a 
positive experience), some were more sensory (e.g., vocal fry, speaking in a frayed or creaky 
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tone). I hypothesized that knowledge of a concept facilitates identifying and remembering 
instances of it, and so those familiar with concepts would report a greater number of encounters 
with them than those who not familiar. 
Method  
Three hundred and two U.S. Americans (45.4% female; Mage = 35.02, SD = 10.92, range 
= 20 to 75; 78.8% non-Hispanic white) were recruited via TurkPrime (Litman, Robinson, & 
Abberbock, 2017). 
 Participants were presented with 20 novel concepts. The concepts were compiled from 
neologisms (e.g., egosurf: to boost one’s ego by searching for one’s own name on Google or 
other search engines; Adams & Lloyd, 1983; Pinker, 2007; Skurnick, 2015) and terminologies 
devised by academics (e.g., benevolent sexism; Glick & Fiske, 1996). The concepts covered a 
range of topical areas including psychology (e.g., imposter syndrome), linguistics (e.g., vocal 
fry), finance (e.g., bangst), modern technology (e.g., figital), social media (e.g., vaguebooking), 
and sensory experiences (e.g., sight: pareidolia; sound: uptalk; smell: sillage; touch: 
shoeburyness) (see Appendix A for definitions of all novel concepts).  
 Participants were first asked if they had heard of each concept. They were then presented 
with the definition and examples (e.g., quotes, pictures, sound clips) of the concept. If 
participants answered yes to having heard of the concept, they were asked if this was the 
definition they had in mind. Participants were categorized as knowing the concept only if they 
indicated having heard of the concept and having the correct definition. Next, participants were 
asked how many times they noticed or experienced instances of the concept over the past 2 
weeks (0 = 0 time, 1 = 1 time, 2 = 2 times, 3 = 3 times, 4 = 4 times, 5 = times, 6 = 6-7 times, 7 = 
8-10 times, 8 = 11-14 times, 9 = 15-20 times, 10 = more than 20 times).  
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Results 
I predicted that participants would report fewer encounters with the concepts of which 
they were hypocognitive compared to concepts of which they had knowledge. To address this 
prediction, I conducted a linear mixed model analysis (Judd, Westfall, & Kenny, 2017) 
predicting the number of encounters each participant reported for each concept from the fixed 
effect of concept knowledge (unknown = -0.5, known = +0.5) and the random effects of 
participant (random intercept, random slope for knowledge) and concept (random intercept, 
random slope for knowledge). 
 As predicted, participants who were hypocognitive of a concept reported experiencing 
fewer instances of it over the past two weeks (M = 2.13, SE = .04, 95% confidence interval [2.06, 
2.20]) compared to those who knew the concept (M = 2.96, SE = .12, [2.73, 3.18]), b = .82, SE = 
.14, t(78.85) = 5.92, p < .001, [.53, 1.10] (see Figure 1 for a depiction of reported frequencies of 
encountering each concept).  
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Figure 1. Frequency of experiencing instances of a known versus unknown concept over the past 
two weeks. 
Study 2A: Recognition of Common Versus Exotic Fruits 
 Study 1 suggested that hypocognition interfered with identifying instances of a concept. 
However, the true frequency with which participants encountered instances of the concepts is 
unclear, and hence, the accuracy of their reports of encounter. The correlational nature of Study 1 
also left open an alternative explanation: participants who reported not knowing a concept might 
have been those to whom instances of the concept rarely occurred, and the disproportionate 
frequency with which they experience such instances could have primed a lack of awareness of 
the underlying concept. 
 Study 2A addressed these limitations by examining whether hypocognition would impede 
accurate recognition while ensuring the same amount of exposure to culturally familiar versus 
unfamiliar objects. I showed American participants a basket containing common and exotic 
fruits. I predicted that, in a subsequent task to discriminate between fruits displayed versus not 
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displayed, participants would be less accurate in recognizing culturally unfamiliar fruits of which 
they are hypocognitive, compared to familiar fruits.  
Method 
 Two hundred and twelve U.S. Americans (48.6% female; Mage = 36.90, SD = 10.66, 
range = 22 to 68; 73.6% non-Hispanic white) were recruited via TurkPrime.  
 Participants imagined strolling around a fruit festival and coming upon a basket of fresh 
fruits. There was no mention of a memory task. They were then presented with the fruit basket 
for 10 seconds (Figure 2). The basket contained 5 familiar fruits (set I: orange, banana, 
strawberry, pineapple, watermelon; or set II: apple, lemon, pear, cherry, grapes) and 5 unfamiliar 
fruits (set I: mamey sapote, lychee, breadfruit, rambutan, salak; or set II: durian, custard apple, 
mangosteen, longan, bayberry). Participants were randomly assigned to one of the two fruit sets. 
Next, participants completed a two-minute numerical distraction task, counting backwards by 3 
in writing from the number 5486.  
Afterwards, participants were presented with a list of fruit pictures (different from those 
previously displayed) representing all 10 familiar fruits (5 previously displayed, 5 not displayed) 
and 10 unfamiliar fruits (5 previously displayed, 5 not displayed). Participants were asked to 
indicate their level of certainty regarding whether they have previously seen each of the fruits (1 
= this fruit definitely was not there to 6 = this fruit definitely was there).  
Following the recognition task, participants indicated if they knew each fruit, and if so, 
were asked to identify each fruit (coded 0 = failed to correctly identify/did not know the fruit, 1 = 
correctly identified/knew the fruit). They also rated the extent to which they were familiar with 
each fruit (1 = not at all familiar to 7 = very familiar).   
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Figure 2. An example of the fruit basket displayed containing culturally familiar and unfamiliar 
fruits. 
 
Results  
 Manipulation checks. I assessed participants’ knowledge of and familiarity with the 
familiar and unfamiliar fruits. To examine fruit knowledge, I formed composite scores by 
calculating the proportion of “know” responses for each of the four categories: familiar fruits 
displayed, unfamiliar fruits displayed, familiar fruits not displayed, and unfamiliar fruits not 
displayed. I then conducted a general linear mixed model predicting knowledge from the fixed 
effects of fruit familiarity (unfamiliar = -0.5, familiar = +0.5), display condition (not displayed = 
-0.5, displayed = +0.5), fruit set (set I = -0.5, set II = +0.5), their interactions; and the random 
effect of participant (random intercept; random slope for familiarity). To examine fruit 
familiarity, I conducted a linear mixed model with the same fixed effects and a maximal random 
effects structure (see Supplemental Online Materials for additional detail on random effects 
specification). 
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Participants were more likely to know a familiar fruit (M = .98, SE = .01, [.96, .99]) than 
an unfamiliar one (M = .05, SE = .01, [.04, .06]), b = .92, SE = .01, t(210.28) = 108.46, p < .001, 
[.91, .94]. Participants also rated themselves as more familiar with a familiar fruit (M = 6.71, SE 
= .03, [6.64, 6.77]) than an unfamiliar fruit (M = 2.25, SE = .03, [2.19, 2.31]), b = 4.45, SE = .19, 
t(31.92) = 22.88, p < .001, [4.06, 4.85]. Note that key effects were largely consistent across 
nuisance factors (e.g., set, order) throughout Studies 2 to 4. 
Recognition. I next examined whether unfamiliarity (versus familiarity) with a fruit 
impaired recognition accuracy via two different analyses. First, I conducted a linear mixed model 
analysis predicting recognition from the fixed effects of fruit familiarity, display condition, fruit 
set, their interactions; and the random effects of participant (random intercept, random slopes for 
familiarity, display condition, and their interaction) and fruit (random intercept, random slope for 
display condition). The analysis revealed that participants were more likely to report seeing a 
displayed fruit (M = 4.29, SE = .04, [4.22, 4.37]) than an undisplayed fruit (M = 2.57, SE = .04, 
[2.49, 2.65]), b = 1.72, SE = .17, t(27.16) = 9.94, p < .001, [1.37, 2.08].  
This main effect was qualified by an expected interaction with familiarity, b = .88, SE = 
.31, t(16.91) = 2.85, p = .011, [.23, 1.52]. For familiar fruits, participants were more likely to 
recognize one that was displayed to them compared to one that was not (MDisplayed = 4.82 versus 
MUndisplayed = 2.66), b = 2.16, SE = .24, z = 9.03, p < .001, [1.57, 2.75]. However, this recognition 
accuracy was diminished for unfamiliar fruits (MDisplayed = 3.76 versus MUndisplayed = 2.48), b = 
1.28, SE = .22, z = 5.75, p < .001, [.73, 1.84]. 
A signal detection analysis confirmed that participants were more inaccurate in 
recognizing unfamiliar than familiar fruits. In particular, I calculated two independent measures 
from signal detection theory: sensitivity (d’), the ability to distinguish previously displayed fruits 
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from non-displayed foils; and response bias (c), the threshold for answering “the fruit was there” 
or “the fruit was not there” regardless of display condition (Stanislaw & Todorov, 1999). For 
each index, I conducted a linear mixed model with the fixed effects of fruit familiarity, fruit set, 
their interactions; and the random intercept of participant. Analyses revealed that participants 
showed less sensitivity toward recognizing unfamiliar (d’ = .79) than familiar fruits (d’ = 1.38), b 
= .58, SE = .07, t(210) = 8.58, p < .001, [.45, .71]. They also showed greater bias towards not 
seeing the unfamiliar fruits (c = .24) compared to familiar fruits (c = -.15), b = -.39, SE = .05, 
t(210) = -8.61, p < .001, [-.48, -.30]. 
Study 2B: Recognition of Familiar Versus Unfamiliar Symbols 
Study 2A demonstrated that hypocognition impeded recognition of fruits for which U.S. 
Americans lacked conceptual knowledge. However, one could argue that the unfamiliar fruits 
included in Study 2A were perceptually less salient than the familiar fruits, thus producing the 
recognition deficits I attributed to hypocognition. Thus, Study 2B took the same visual stimuli 
and rendered them either familiar or unfamiliar by taking cursive alphabetic letters and showing 
them to participants in a mix of upright (familiar) and rotated/flipped (unfamiliar) positions. I 
predicted that participants would be less accurate in recognizing the stimuli when rendered as 
unfamiliar symbols than in the form of familiar letters. 
Method 
 Two hundred and seventy-two U.S. Americans (60.7% female; Mage = 38.42, SD = 12.16, 
range = 18 to 74; 79.0% non-Hispanic white) were recruited via TurkPrime. I prescreened for 
participants whose first language is English to ensure proficiency in comprehending English 
letters. 
 Participants imagined coming across a sheet of paper with a set of symbols drawn on it. 
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There was no mention of a memory task. They were then presented with the symbols for 10 
seconds (Figure 3). The symbols were 5 cursive letters in their usual orientation (set I: , ,  
, ,  ; or set II: , , , , ) and 5 cursive letters rotated or flipped so as to 
be rendered unrecognizable (set I: , , , , ; or set II: , , , ,   ). 
Participants were randomly assigned to one of the two symbol sets. Within each set of 10 letters, 
participants were randomly assigned to one of the two rotation orders: first 5 letters regular + 
second 5 letters rotated or flipped; or first 5 letters rotated or flipped + second 5 letters regular. 
Next, participants completed the same numerical distraction task as in Study 2A. 
Afterwards, participants were presented with a list of symbol pictures representing all 10 
regular letters (familiar symbols: 5 previously displayed, 5 not displayed) and 10 rotated or 
flipped letters (unfamiliar symbols: 5 previously displayed, 5 not displayed). Pictures of symbols 
used in the recognition task were different from those in the previously displayed paper image to 
prevent memory based on superficial features such as curviness. Participants were asked to 
indicate their level of certainty regarding whether they have previously seen each of the symbols 
(1 = this symbol definitely was not there to 6 = this symbol definitely was there).  
Following the recognition task, participants indicated if they knew each symbol (coded 0 
= failed to correctly identify/did not know the symbol, 1 = correctly identified/knew the symbol). 
They also rated the extent to which they were familiar with each symbol (1 = not at all familiar 
to 7 = very familiar).   
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Figure 3. An example of the familiar and unfamiliar cursive symbols displayed. 
 
Results  
 Manipulation checks. To examine symbol knowledge and symbol familiarity, I 
conducted similar linear mixed models as in Study 2A, with the additional fixed effect of rotation 
order (rotation order I = -0.5, rotation order II = +0.5; see Supplemental Online Materials for 
detail on model specification). Participants were more likely to know symbols in a familiar 
orientation (M = .92, SE = .01, [.91, .94]) than in an unfamiliar orientation (M = .12, SE = .01, 
[.11, .14]), b = .80, SE = .01, t(268) = 61.35, p < .001, [.78, .83]. Participants also rated 
themselves to be more familiar with symbols in a familiar orientation (M = 6.21, SE = .04, [6.14, 
6.28]) than in an unfamiliar orientation (M = 2.81, SE = .04, [2.74, 2.88]), b = 3.41, SE = .20, 
t(33.07) = 17.30, p < .001, [3.01, 3.81].  
Recognition. I examined recognition accuracy using mixed model analyses similar to 
those in Study 2A. Participants were more likely to report seeing a displayed symbol (M = 3.70, 
SE = .03, [3.64, 3.76]) than an undisplayed symbol (M = 3.02, SE = .03, [2.96, 3.08]), b = .68, SE 
= .10, t(21.68) = 6.76, p < .001, [.48, .87]. This effect was qualified by the orientation of the 
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symbol, b = .50, SE = .13, t(19.25) = 3.79, p = .001, [.24, .76]. Participants more accurately 
identified symbols oriented as familiar, upright letters when they were displayed versus not 
displayed (MDisplayed = 3.80 versus MUndisplayed = 2.87), b = .93, SE = .11, z = 8.79, p < .001, [.67, 
1.18]. However, this recognition accuracy worsened when the symbols were oriented as 
unfamiliar, rotated letters (MDisplayed = 3.59 versus MUndisplayed = 3.18), b = .43, SE = .13, z = 3.22, 
p = .001, [.10, .75].   
Signal detection analyses confirmed these findings. Participants showed less sensitivity 
toward recognizing symbols that were unfamiliar (d’ = .26) than familiar (d’ = .58), b = .32, SE 
= .05, t(268) = 5.95, p < .001, [.21, .42]. There was no difference in bias (c = .07 vs. .10), b = 
.04, SE = .04, t(268) = .92, p = .359, [-.04, .11]. 
Study 3 Encoding Frequency of Common and Exotic Fruit 
Study 3 moved from recognizing an object’s mere presence to tracking its frequency of 
encounter, a task on which people typically show remarkable performance despite circumstances 
that should interfere with it (Hasher & Chromiak, 1977; Hasher & Zacks, 1979; R.T. Zacks, 
Hasher, Alba, Sanft, & Rose, 1984). I showed American participants common and exotic fruits 
one at a time, varying the frequency at which each fruit occurred from 0 to 4 times. I expected 
that Americans would be less accurate in encoding the frequency of culturally unfamiliar fruits 
for which they have no concept, compared to familiar ones.  
Method 
 One hundred and ninety-six U.S. Americans (52.6% female; Mage = 35.98, SD = 10.52, 
range = 18 to 70; 66.3% non-Hispanic white) were recruited via TurkPrime.  
To test for automatic frequency encoding, I adopted a classic paradigm by Hasher & 
Chromiak (1977). Participants were presented with familiar and unfamiliar fruit pictures one at a 
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time, with each picture appearing for 3 seconds. No fruit names were shown. Participants were 
asked to try to remember the fruits. The instruction made no explicit mention of their frequency. 
The fruit list comprised 34 pictures, with the first and last 5 pictures serving as buffers to 
absorb primacy and recency effects along with 24 critical pictures of fruits. The critical fruits 
consisted of 6 familiar fruits (Set I: apple, orange, lemon; Set II: coconut, strawberry, banana) 
and 6 unfamiliar fruits (Set I: durian, mangosteen, custard apple; Set II: mamey sapote, santol, 
longan). Within each fruit set, each fruit occurred 0, 2, or 4 times. For fruits that occurred 2 or 4 
times, no successive repetition was allowed (i.e., a picture of an apple must be followed by a 
picture other than an apple). In addition, different pictures of the same fruit were used, so 
participants saw any particular picture of a fruit only once. To vary the combinations of 
individual fruits and the frequencies at which they occur, I randomly assigned participants to one 
of three frequency order conditions following a Latin square design (Table 1). 
 
Table 1 Fruit Familiarity x Fruit Set x Frequency Order x Actual Frequency Design 
 
 
Following the serial presentation, participants were asked to estimate the number of times 
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they saw each fruit. A picture (rather than the name) of each fruit was displayed. The picture of 
each fruit shown in the frequency estimation phase differed from any pictures of the fruit shown 
in the serial presentation phase. 
Results 
 Estimated frequency. Were participants more inaccurate in remembering fruits for 
which they lacked conceptual knowledge? I subjected participants’ frequency estimates to a 
linear mixed model that included the fixed effects of fruit familiarity (unfamiliar = -0.5, familiar 
= +0.5), actual frequency (0, 2, 4 times), fruit set, frequency order, all interactions; and the 
random effects of participant (random intercept; random slopes for actual frequency, familiarity, 
and their interaction).  
Based on the above model, I conducted two forms of analyses to measure frequency 
accuracy (Naveh-Benjamin & Jonides, 1986). The first measure is the slope (b) of the function 
that regresses estimated frequency on actual frequency (0-4 times as a continuous variable). The 
closer the slope is to 1, the more sensitive participants are to variations in frequency. The second 
measure is the absolute magnitude of frequency estimates at each level of actual frequencies (0, 
2, 4 times as discrete levels of a categorical variable). The closer the frequency estimates are to 
actual frequencies, the more accurate participants are in their absolute estimates (see 
Supplemental Online Materials for model specification).  
 Sensitivity to frequency. Overall, participants were relatively sensitive to the varying 
frequencies at which each fruit appeared, b = .58, SE = .02, t(195) = 29.98, p < .001, [.54, .62]. 
However, this sensitivity was impaired for unfamiliar fruits, as indicated by a significant actual 
frequency x familiarity interaction, b = .07, SE = .02, t(195) = 3.25, p = .001, [.03, .11]. 
Participants were worse at discriminating among actual levels of frequency at which unfamiliar 
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fruits occurred (b = .55, SE = .02, z = 25.56, p < .001, [.50, .59]) compared to familiar fruits (b = 
.61, SE = .02, z = 28.36, p < .001, [.56, .66]). 
 Magnitude of frequency estimates. Overall, participants underestimated the frequency of 
unfamiliar fruits (M = 1.64, SE = .03, [1.58, 1.69]) compared to familiar fruits (M = 1.81, SE = 
.03, [1.75, 1.86]), b = .17, SE = .04, t(195) = -4.74, p < .001, [.10, .24] (Figure 4). 
 
Figure 4. Estimated frequency of familiar versus unfamiliar fruits. 
 
Study 4 Encoding Frequency of Cheese & Dumplings: Cross-Cultural Evidence 
In Study 3, participants failed to track exotic fruits as accurately as common fruits. 
However, one could again argue that particular features of the unfamiliar fruits, not 
hypocognition itself, impeded frequency accuracy. Thus, in Study 4, I took two sets of objects—
cheeses and dumplings—and compared their frequency estimates across two cultures that differ 
in which type of food is familiar. Numerous cheeses are consumed by the British, but not the 
Chinese; various dumplings make up a major portion of Chinese cuisine, but not British diet. 
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Regarding hypocognition, I propose that dumplings are as hypocognized in British culture as 
cheeses are in Chinese culture.  
I then replicated Study 3, showing British and Chinese participants cheeses and 
dumplings at varying frequencies and asking them to estimate the frequency at which each food 
item occurred. I predicted that British participants would be less accurate in tracking the 
frequency of dumplings than cheese, whereas Chinese would show the opposite pattern.  
Method 
One hundred and eighty-nine U.K. citizen of European descent (66.7% female; Mage = 
40.17, SD = 12.99, range = 18 to 80) were recruited nationwide via Prolific Academic, a U.K.-
based crowdsourcing platform (Palan & Schitter, 2018). Two hundred and twelve adults from 
mainland China (48.6% female; Mage = 33.99, SD = 8.07, range = 20 to 64) were recruited 
nationwide via Sojump, a China-based online survey platform. 
Participants followed the same procedure as in Study 3. They were presented with a mix 
of cheese and dumpling pictures serially, with the first and last 5 pictures serving as buffers and 
24 pictures of critical food items in the middle. The critical foods consisted of 6 types of cheese 
(Set I: blue cheese, brie, cheddar; Set II: feta, parmesan, Swiss) and 6 types of dumplings (Set I: 
shui jiao, potsticker, shumai; Set II: wonton, har gow, soup dumpling). Within each food set, 
each food item occurred 0, 2, or 4 times (Table 2). 
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Table 2 Culture x Food Familiarity x Food Set x Frequency Order x Actual Frequency Design 
 
 
Next, participants were asked to estimate the number of times they saw each food item. 
Following frequency estimation, participants indicated if they knew each of the cheese and 
dumplings, and if so, were asked to identify each food item (coded 0 = failed to correctly 
identify/not know the food item, 1 = correctly identified/knew the food item). They also rated the 
extent to which they were familiar with each of the cheese and dumplings (1 = not at all familiar 
to 7 = very familiar).   
Results  
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 Manipulation checks. I assessed U.K. and Chinese participants’ knowledge of and 
familiarity with the types of cheese and dumplings presented in the study. To examine cultural 
difference in food knowledge, I conducted a generalized linear mixed model with a binomial 
distribution. The model included the fixed effects of culture (U.K. = -0.5, Chinese = +0.5), food 
type (cheese = -0.5, dumpling = +0.5), their interaction; and the random effects of participant 
(random intercept, random slope for food type) and individual food item (random intercept). To 
examine cultural difference in food familiarity, I conducted a linear mixed model with the same 
fixed and random effects as above. 
 Cultures differed in their knowledge of cheese and dumplings, as indicated by a 
significant culture x food type interaction, b = 12.05, SE = .50, z = 24.22, p < .001, [11.02, 
13.07]. U.K. participants were more likely to correctly identify cheese than dumplings, b = -5.60, 
SE = .55, z = -10.12, p < .001, [-6.96, -4.24]; whereas Chinese participants were more likely to 
correctly identify dumplings than cheese, b = 6.44, SE = .55, z = 11.73, p < .001, [5.09, 7.79]. 
The two cultures also differed in their familiarity with cheese and dumplings, b = 5.44, SE = .18, 
t(396.19) = 31.04, p < .001, [5.09, 5.78]. U.K. participants were more familiar with cheese (M = 
4.22, SE = .05, [4.12, 4.32]) than dumplings (M = 2.01, SE = .05, [1.91, 2.11]), b = -2.21, SE = 
.26, z = -8.52, p < .001, [-2.84, -1.57]; whereas Chinese participants were more familiar with 
dumplings (M = 5.54, SE = .06, [5.42, 5.65]) than cheese (M = 2.31, SE = .06, [2.19, 2.42]), b = 
3.23, SE = .27, z = 11.86, p < .001, [2.56, 3.90].  
Estimated frequency. I examined whether British and Chinese participants were more 
inaccurate at tracking the frequency of culturally unfamiliar foods compared to familiar ones. I 
conducted similar linear mixed models as in Study 3, with the additional fixed effect of culture.  
Sensitivity to frequency variation. Participants across cultures showed impaired 
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sensitivity towards tracking the frequency of culturally unfamiliar foods, as indicated by a 
significant actual frequency x familiarity interaction, b = .15, SE = .01, t(786.9) = 10.47, p < 
.001, [.12, .18]. In particular, British participants were worse at discriminating among actual 
levels of frequency at which dumplings occurred (b = .21, SE = .02, z = 12.05, p < .001, [.17, 
.25]) compared to cheese (b = .40, SE = .02, z = 18.76, p < .007, [.35, .46]), as indicated by an 
actual frequency x familiarity interaction, b = .19, SE = .02, z = 9.32, p < .001, [.15, .24]. 
Chinese showed lessened sensitivity towards the frequencies of culturally unfamiliar (versus 
familiar) foods as well, b = .10, SE = .02, z = 5.39, p < .001, [.06, .15], tracking cheese less 
accurately (b = .30, SE = .02, z = 18.34, p < .001, [.36, .46]) than dumplings (b = .41, SE = .02, z 
= 20.05, p < .001, [.26, .34]). 
Magnitude of frequency estimates. Participants across cultures underestimated the 
frequency at which the culturally unfamiliar foods appeared relative to familiar foods, b = .24, 
SE = .03, t(395) = 7.91, p < .001, [.18, .29]. This underestimation was significant for British 
participants (b = .09, SE = .04, z = 2.17, p = .030) as well as for Chinese (b = .38, SE = .04, z = 
9.22, p < .001) (Figure 5). 
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Figure 5. Estimated frequency of culturally familiar versus unfamiliar foods. 
 
Study 5 Knowing a Concept versus Having a Label 
Studies 1-4 demonstrated that hypocognition degrades the ability to recognize, identify, 
and remember instances and frequency of a concept. However, one might ask whether these 
results are due to hypocognition or simply lacking a verbal label for the objects shown. Cognitive 
psychological research has demonstrated that having a verbal label for an object or category can 
help improve memory (Anderson & Bower, 1972). Even when the label is nonsensical, it can 
provide an associative cue to be accessed at the time of encoding and, to a certain extent, 
facilitate subsequent recall (Klatzky & Rafnel, 1976; Lupyan, Rakison, & McClelland, 2007). In 
addition, having two modalities of coding (e.g., a visual image and a verbal label) aids memory 
more than having just one (Paivio, 1991; Paivio & Csapo, 1971). Hence, it could be that one has 
a verbal label for “apple” but not “durian” when seeing the pictures of these fruits, and the mere 
lack of labeling––rather than of underlying associations––leads to worse recognition, encoding, 
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and retention.  
Study 5 aimed to disentangle the effect of not knowing a concept (hypocognition) from 
that of not having a verbal label for it. I proposed that lacking an underlying concept for an 
object––even when verbal labeling is present––still impairs frequency encoding.  
To show this effect, I began by taking the cursive alphabetic letters from Study 2B and 
rotated/flipped them to render them unrecognizable. I then used the frequency encoding 
paradigm in Studies 3-4, showing participants the unfamiliar symbols at varying frequencies and 
asking them to estimate the frequency at which each symbol occurred. In the No Label/Concept 
condition, each symbol was displayed with no accompanying auditory label. In the Label 
condition, each symbol was displayed with a nonsensical auditory label, such that participants 
would be hypocognitive of the conceptual knowledge of letters underlying the displayed symbols 
despite having verbal labels for such symbols. In the Concept condition, each symbol was 
displayed with an auditory label carrying conceptual knowledge. I predicted that participants will 
be the least accurate in tracking the frequency of symbols accompanied by no labels or concepts. 
More importantly, they would also be less accurate in tracking the frequency of symbols 
accompanied by nonsensical labels as compared to when they were accompanied by labels that 
bring underlying conceptual knowledge.  
Method  
Seven hundred and two U.S. Americans (38.9% female; Mage = 36.52, SD = 10.62, range 
= 19 to 82; 68.1% non-Hispanic white) were recruited via TurkPrime.  
Participants followed a similar procedure as in Studies 3 and 4. They were presented with 
unfamiliar symbol pictures representing cursive letters rotated or flipped (similar stimuli as in 
Study 2B) serially, with the first and last 5 pictures serving as buffers and 24 pictures of critical 
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symbols in the middle. The critical symbols consisted of 12 symbols (Set I: , , ; Set II: 
, ,  ; Set III: , , ; Set IV: , ,  ). Within each symbol set, each symbol item occurred 
0, 2, or 4 times (see Supplemental Online Materials for detail on study design and frequency 
order assignment). 
During the serial presentation phase, participants were randomly assigned to one of three 
labeling conditions (Table 3). In the No Label/Concept condition, each symbol picture was 
displayed with no accompanying sound. In the Label condition, each symbol picture was 
displayed with an accompanying nonsensical sound label (e.g.,  was accompanied by the 
sound “ree”). In the Concept condition, each symbol picture was displayed with an 
accompanying sound label that brought conceptual knowledge to the stimulus (e.g.,  was 
accompanied by the sound “queue”, as how the letter q sounds). Six native English-speaking 
research assistants (3 male, 3 female) articulated sounds for each symbol. I ensured that within 
each labeling condition, no repeating symbol was accompanied by the same voice.   
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Table 3 Labeling Condition x Symbol Set x Frequency Order x Actual Frequency Design 
 
 
Following the serial presentation, participants were asked to estimate the number of times 
they saw each symbol.  
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Results  
Estimated frequency. I conducted two a priori contrasts. First, I examined whether 
participants were more inaccurate at tracking the frequency of unfamiliar symbols with no 
label/concept relative to those accompanied by either labels or concepts (contrast I: No 
Label/Concept = -0.5, Label = +0.25, Concept = +0.25). Next, I examined whether participants 
were more inaccurate at tracking the frequency of unfamiliar symbols accompanied by mere 
labels relative to those accompanied by labels that bring underlying conceptual knowledge 
(contrast II: No Label/Concept = 0, Label = -0.5, Concept = +0.5). I conducted similar linear 
mixed models as in Studies 3 and 4, with the additional fixed effect of labeling condition (see 
Supplemental Online Materials for model specification).  
Sensitivity to frequency variation. Participants showed impaired sensitivity towards 
tracking the frequency of unfamiliar symbols with no label/concept, as indicated by a significant 
actual frequency x contrast I (no label/concept versus label/concept) interaction, b = .10, SE = 
.02, t(693.0) = 4.32, p < .001, [.06, .15]. In particular, participants were worse at discriminating 
among actual levels of frequency of symbols accompanied by no label/concept (b = .12, SE = 
.02, z = 6.08, p < .001, [.08, .17]) compared to symbols accompanied by either labels or concepts 
(b = .20, SE = .02, z = 11.44, p < .001, [.16, .24]).  
However, merely having a label for an unfamiliar symbol did not aid remembering as 
well as having conceptual knowledge of the symbol. Participants showed impaired sensitivity 
towards tracking the frequency of unfamiliar symbols accompanied by nonsensical labels, as 
indicated by a significant actual frequency x contrast II (label versus concept) interaction, b = 
.05, SE = .02, t(693.0) = 2.28, p = .023, [.01, .08]. In particular, participants were worse at 
discriminating among actual levels of frequency of symbols accompanied by nonsensical labels 
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(b = .18, SE = .02, z = 8.75, p < .001, [.13, .22]) compared to symbols accompanied by labels 
bringing conceptual knowledge (b = .22, SE = .02, z = 11.08, p < .001, [.17, .27]).  
 Magnitude of frequency estimates. Overall, participants underestimated the frequency of 
symbols accompanied by no label/concept (M = 1.48, SE = .01, [1.45, 1.50]) compared to those 
accompanied by either labels or concepts (M = 1.25, SE = .02, [1.21, 1.29]), b = .31, SE = .08, 
t(121.16) = 3.92, p < .001, [.15, .46] (Figure 6). 
 
Figure 6. Estimated frequency of unfamiliar symbols accompanied by labels with conceptual 
information, nonsensical labels, or no label/conceptual information. 
 
Discussion 
Across six studies, participants hypocognitive of a category showed impairments in 
tracking encounters with instances of that category. Participants lacking conceptual knowledge 
reported experiencing fewer instances in daily life of the concept compared to people more 
familiar with the concept (Study 1), whether the concept be abstract or sensory in nature. In 
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subsequent studies, when presented with familiar and exotic objects, participants achieved less 
accuracy in identifying and tracking the frequency of objects that lay outside the typical 
experience of their culture, such as Americans encountering exotic fruits (Studies 2A & 3) and 
alphabetic letters rotated away from their usual visual orientation (Studies 2B & 5). The same 
pattern emerged among Britishers encountering Asian dumplings, and Chinese participants 
exposed to examples of cheese (Study 4). Each cultural group better tracked the frequency of 
foods common in their culture than they did the objects hypocognized in their culture. 
Going Beyond Absence of Verbal Labeling 
Classic literature in anthropology describes the notion of hypocognition through accounts 
of Tahitians who lacked the conception of grief and thus having an impoverished experience of it 
(R. I. Levy, 1973). I extended this notion beyond anthropological discussions, introducing a 
broader framework highlighting the role of impoverished conceptual knowledge in impairing 
cognitive processing of fundamental information, such as frequency of encounter.        
However, the work does leave a question. Is hypocognition just not having a word, or 
label, to describe something? The findings suggest not. Hypocognition is a lack of conceptual 
knowledge, and lacking conceptual knowledge and lacking verbal labeling are two independent 
processes (Lupyan, 2008; Lupyan & Thompson-Schill, 2012). In Study 5, even when verbal 
labeling of rotated cursive letters was present, lacking the culturally-familiar concept deprived 
people of the penumbra of cognitive associations to each letter that impaired performance. This 
result echoes recent developments in emotion research, which demonstrate that emotion words 
do not influence emotion perception unless they match concepts that are culturally meaningful. 
For example, one study found that Himbia participants showed impairment perceiving Western 
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emotions, even when English translations were provided, because they lacked the underlying 
emotion categories (Gendron, Roberson, van der Vyver, & Barrett, 2014).  
In this way, these findings also clarify the definition of hypocognition: One can have a 
linguistic label for a phenomenon, yet still have impoverished experiences of it. Americans may 
be told about the Japanese emotion amae, or be elicited to experience fragmentary aspects of it 
(Niiya et al., 2006), but they would come away with an incomplete experience and a nebulous 
understanding. Similarly, people can throw around buzzwords such as “sustainability” or “White 
privilege”, yet stay hypocognitive of them and have little cognitive representation of what either 
term entails (Kho, 2014; Wu & Dunning, 2019, 2020). On the other hand, one can lack a label 
for a concept, yet have the conceptual knowledge for it. Animals respond to categories of sight 
and smell without having names for such categories (Astley & Wasserman, 1998). Aphasic 
patients can have an encyclopedic understanding of an object without having a label for it (Druks 
& Shallice, 2000). In these cases, they are not considered hypocognitive, even though there is no 
word to describe what they sense.  
That said, having a label can aid cognitive processing to a certain extent. Some research 
has shown that even having a non-sensical label can provide an associative cue and facilitate 
encoding to some degree (Klatzky & Rafnel, 1976; Lupyan et al., 2007). Indeed, Study 5 did 
show that when provided with non-sensical auditory labels of rotated letters, participants tracked 
them more accurately than having neither labeling nor concept. Nevertheless, it is important to 
note that their encoding during a state of hypocognition (with verbal labeling) still proved to be 
inferior than encoding when having verbal labeling carrying conceptual knowledge.  
Absence of Schema and Retention of Information 
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This work also carries implications for classic work on the role of schema on cognition. 
Classic work on schemata, particularly efforts from social psychology, almost exclusively 
focused on how schemata distorted memory and made people less accurate (J. B. Black et al., 
1979; Brewer & Treyens, 1981). In reaction, critics of schema theory noted a lack of theory for 
how schema may aid accuracy in cognitive functioning (Alba & Hasher, 1983). Although 
schema theory accounted for distortions in remembering (Anderson & Bower, 1973; G. H. 
Bower, Black, & Turner, 1979; Brewer & Treyens, 1981), it often failed to focus on how schema 
might support rich and accurate memory traces for complex events.  
The studies provide partial evidence for the accuracy account of schema, such that 
participants indeed showed notable accuracy in tracking the presence (Studies 1-2) and 
frequency (Studies 3-5) of events and objects with which they had conceptual knowledge. 
However, I highlight a precondition for such accuracy: a conceptual framework has to be in 
place. In absence of the conceptual knowledge contained in a schema, people showed deficits in 
their fundamental retention of information––a deficit in an ability shown in past literature to be 
invariable across numerous cognitive variables (Hasher & Zacks, 1984).  
There is room, however, for further study about how people might remember instances of 
encounter that lie outside their conceptual knowledge. Debates about schema theory point to 
mixed evidence regarding the retention of schema-inconsistent information. While there is much 
agreement on whether the presence of a schema can lead to memory distortion, disagreements 
arise on what happens when there is an absence of a schema (Thorndyke & Yekovich, 1980). 
Many schema models suggest that schema-inconsistent information would fade from memory 
(Brewer, 2000). However, other variations of schema models pose the alternative possibility that 
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schema-consistent elements may blend into a homogenous background, whereas schema-
inconsistent elements stand out and lead to heightened recall (e.g., Davidson & Hoe, 1993).  
Along these lines, further work may show that events or objects that are hypocognized 
may stand out as more distinctive than those consistent with one’s existing conceptual 
knowledge, and thus facilitate recall. However, findings thus far across studies show the 
opposite, such that hypocognition depletes retention of information, rather than sharpening its 
distinctiveness and heightening recall. Thinking through the potential fate of hypocognized 
categories in memory might be a profitable avenue for future research. 
Finally, findings highlight a theoretical connection between the cultural psychological 
literature and the research on expertise. Individually, people are much like novices rather than 
experts when they observe and encode objects beyond their conceptual landscape, perceiving 
superficial attributes while missing the endogenous associations (M. T. H. Chi, Glaser, & Rees, 
1982). They may still observe some aspects of the experience, but the experience is often crude 
and fragmentary. Culturally, the differing collections of concepts that cultural communities 
accrue over time provide a sufficient set of expertise for how people should navigate ways of 
living (Oyserman, 2017), but it renders a person inexpert once they step outside of the 
community.  
Therein lies the irony of experiencing a culture foreign to one’s own. As people venture 
outside of their familiar cultural milieu in an earnest attempt to gain new experiences, how much 
of their experience is one that the mind never registers? Like the oddities of a durian an 
American might come to experience, how much of people’s experience with foreign cultures 
comprise of hazy fragments they struggle to comprehend, peculiar segments distorted through 
their own conceptual lens, unwitting blunders they commit yet fail to recognize? 
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Chapter 3 Social Consequences: Hypocognition and the Invisibility of Social Privilege 
A slew of police killings in 2020 involving the deaths of George Floyd, Ahmaud Arbery, 
and Breonna Taylor brought to light the pervasiveness of systemic racism and everyday threat 
Black Americans face (“George Floyd updates: 10th night of protest follows somber memorial,” 
2020; Gupta, 2020). However, whereas a majority of Black Americans perceive racial 
discrimination in daily life, fewer than half of White Americans agree with such perception 
(Parker, Horowitz, & Mahl, 2016). On views of White privilege, a whopping 92% of Blacks 
report that Whites benefit from social advantages that Blacks lack, whereas only 46% of Whites 
think similarly (Oliphant, 2017). A similar attitudinal chasm has widened between genders. 
According to a 2017 Pew report, women report personally experiencing discrimination twice as 
often as men. However, whereas 41% of women acknowledge that men have easier lives than 
women, only 28% of men agree (Menasce Horowitz, Parker, & Stepler, 2017). 
Why do people from dominant social groups perceive less privilege in their lives than 
that perceived by people from subordinate groups? I propose that dominant social groups suffer 
from hypocognition, or the lack of a cognitive or conceptual representation, of social privilege 
(Wu & Dunning, 2018a, 2018b, 2020). They are largely ignorant of the advantages they enjoy as 
dominant social groups in society or of disadvantages endured by other groups. Their knowledge 
of privilege is more fragmentary or impoverished than that held by other groups. Hence, they fail 
to acknowledge their privilege not necessarily because they actively deny it, but because they 
have little conception of what it is. As a consequence, they lack the cognitive architecture to 
identify, understand, and remember social privilege and its instantiations. 
 44 
Hypocognition as a Cognitive Account of Privilege Blindness 
Common approaches to studying privilege blindness focus on motivation, such that 
people from advantaged social groups minimalize discrimination and actively deny their social 
privilege out of defensive motivations to maintain innocence of self-image (Unzueta & Lowery, 
2008). This motivational account asserts that social privilege is not invisible. Rather, people are 
well aware of the advantages their social identity entails and engage in a process of intentional 
“cloaking” of that privilege (Phillips & Lowery, 2018).  
 I acknowledge that people may engage in intentional blindness to assuage guilt and 
minimize discomfort when confronted with their privilege. However, I highlight a cognitive 
deficit that occurs prior to motivational defense. Members of dominant social groups, including 
well-intentioned individuals, often fail to acknowledge their privilege because social privileges 
are often invisible to those who have them. If one does not know what the concept of privilege 
entails or the everyday burdens carried by non-privileged groups, one cannot acknowledge that 
the absence of such burdens is an advantage they have.  
 I term the absence of cognitive representation of privilege the hypocognition of privilege 
(Wu & Dunning, 2020). To be hypocognitive of an idea is to lack its conceptual knowledge, 
including its instantiations, defining features, and their accompanying associations (Wu & 
Dunning, 2018a, 2019). In cognitive psychological terms, socially dominant group members lack 
a schema for privilege, a knowledge structure that organizes such information and that aids in 
cognitive processing of experience (Bartlett, 1932; Neisser, 1976).  
 To be hypocognitive of social privilege is to have an impoverished experience of what 
one’s privilege confers. For example, no one will have difficulty recognizing a school desk, a 
pair of scissors, a spiral notebook, a guitar, or a can opener. However, a left-hander may readily 
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identify the theme of what those objects represent: items commonly designed for right-handers 
which present daily inconveniences for left-handers. Such a theme would remain unrecognized 
among right-handers. Right-handers would have little schema of the category represented by 
objects that pose difficulties for left-handers and hence, not be aware of the privilege their 
handedness entails.   
 A hypocognition approach to examining the invisibility of social privilege resonates with 
research on the Marley hypothesis, which focuses on a cognitive account in explaining group 
asymmetries in recognizing discrimination. The Marley hypothesis states that it is the ignorance 
of historical reality that underlies White Americans’ dismissal of systemic racism (Nelson, 
Adams, & Salter, 2013), and simply learning about the history of housing discrimination helps 
boost perception about the prevalence of racism (Bonam, Nair Das, Coleman, & Salter, 2019).  
Privilege as the Absence of Disadvantages 
Social privilege is defined as the rights or advantages people of the dominant social 
groups enjoy based on their group membership (L. L. Black & Stone, 2005), but social privilege 
is as much about the absence of inconveniences as the presence of advantages. Women’s studies 
scholar Peggy McIntosh likened privilege to an invisible knapsack of “special provisions, maps, 
passports, codebooks, visas, clothes, tools, and blank checks” (Mcintosh, 1989). Yet, many 
examples of the advantages in the invisible knapsack include “not being followed while 
shopping” and “not being made aware that one’s shape or body odor will be taken as a reflection 
on one’s race”. This absence of daily hassles is crucial to what underlies the invisibility of social 
privilege.  
In examining the hypocognition of privilege, I highlight the routine inconveniences and 
discrimination instances to which dominant social groups are oblivious. I operationalize 
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hypocognition as failure to generate, recall, recognize, or react to hassles or discrimination borne 
by non-privileged social groups.  
In 8 studies, I examine the hypocognition of handedness advantage (Study 1), male 
privilege (Studies 2a-2c), and White privilege (Studies 3a-4) and hypothesize that right-handers, 
men, and Whites are hypocognitive of the disadvantages experienced by left-handers, women, 
and non-Whites. I measure hypocognition by looking for its signatures in cognitive performance. 
If socially advantaged participants lack a cognitive structure (i.e., schema) for privilege, they 
should perform worse than disadvantaged counterparts in generating, remembering, and 
efficiently classifying instances of it (Barsalou, 1983; Neisser, 1976). These socially dominant 
groups will come up with fewer examples of discrimination or daily hassles, recall fewer 
instances from a list previously presented to them, and react more slowly to whether such 
instances are discriminatory. Hypocognition, in turn, will predict group differences in 
acknowledging the privilege that dominant groups enjoy and the extent of discrimination 
experienced by subordinate groups.  
I end with an intervention to reduce hypocognition (Study 5) by showing a TEDx talk of 
a transgender woman recounting her experience living as a man versus a woman. I predict that 
replenishing conceptual knowledge of male privilege will help increase awareness of privilege 
and perception of discrimination.  
Study 1 Hypocognition of Handedness Advantage 
I first explored hypocognition of advantage due to handedness. Unlike gender or racial 
privilege, this advantage taps into a domain not embroiled in social or political contention. By 
examining handedness advantage, I provide a general cognitive demonstration of how privilege 
is more hypocognized among advantaged groups, testing whether right-handers were unable to 
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generate as many handedness-related hassles as left-handers. I further predicted that this 
hypocognition would mediate group difference in awareness of any handedness advantage and 
perception of handedness discrimination.   
Procedure and Measures.  
Five hundred participants (Mage = 39.31, 54.0% female, 75% non-Hispanic White) were 
recruited from the TurkPrime crowdsourcing platform. I worked with the TurkPrime panel 
service to prescreen and sample as many left-handers as right-handers as possible. The final 
sample consisted of 334 right-handers and 166 left-handers.  
Participants were asked to write down as many instances of hassles or inconveniences 
experienced by left-handers in everyday living as they could. These could be instances of 
difficulty when using particular objects or tools or dealing with unfavorable perceptions or 
remarks. Two research assistants coded the number of handedness-related hassles generated by 
each participant (κ = .92). Discrepancies among coders were resolved through discussion.  
Participants also filled out two attitudinal measures. They rated their awareness of handedness 
advantage (e.g., “Right-handed people have it easier than left-handed people”; α = .84), a 
measure adapted from the White Privilege Attitudes Scale––White Privilege Awareness subscale 
(1 = strongly disagree to 6 = strongly agree) (Pinterits, Poteat, & Spanierman, 2009). They also 
indicated how much right-handers and left-handers are or were subject to discrimination in the 
United States in each of the decades from 1950s to 2010s (1 = not at all to 10 = very much) 
(Norton & Sommers, 2011).  
Results.  
Handedness-related hassles. I performed a Poisson regression predicting the number of 
handedness-related hassles listed from handedness (left-handed = -0.5, right-handed = +0.5), 
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given that the number of hassles is a count variable. Right-handers generated fewer instances of 
handedness-related hassles (M = 3.57, SE = .10) than left-handers (M = 5.72, SE =.19), b = -.47, 
SE = .04, z = -10.84, p < .001.  
Privilege awareness and discrimination perception. Right-handers were also less 
aware of their handedness advantage (M = 2.77, SE = .08) than left-handers (M = 3.70, SE = .12), 
t(498) = 6.44, p < .001, d = .61. 
Regarding perceived discrimination, I computed difference scores (discrimination for 
left-handers – discrimination for right-handers) for the each of the seven decades. I subjected the 
discrimination difference scores to a 2 handedness (right-handed vs. left-handed) x 7 decades 
(1950s thru 2010s) mixed-design ANOVA. Overall, right-handed participants perceived less 
discrimination against left-handers (relative to right-handers) (M = 1.71, SE = .12) than left-
handed participants (M = 3.31, SE = .17), F(1, 498) = 56.86, p < .001, ηp2 = .10. This perceptual 
gap narrowed over the decades, as indicated by a significant handedness x decade interaction, 
F(1.75, 871.71) = 56.85, p < .001, ηp2 = .10. Even so, simple effects analyses showed that group 
difference in perceived discrimination was still significant for each of the seven decades, bs > 
.38, t(498)s > 2.12, ps < .035. 
 Mediation. Hypocognition among right-handers (versus left-handers) mediated group 
difference in acknowledging handedness advantage. Specifically, the lack of handedness hassles 
generated by right- (versus left-) handers predicted their lower awareness of handedness 
advantage (indirect effect = -.22, 95% CI [-.32, -.14]) (Figure 7).  
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Figure 7. Simple mediation model for the effect of handedness on privilege awareness via the 
number of handedness-related hassles generated. 
 
I then examined whether the number of listed hassles mediated the relationship between 
handedness (left-handed = -0.5, right-handed = +0.5) and perceiving the extent of discrimination 
faced by left-handers relative to right-handers (discrimination difference score) while including 
the moderating effects of decade (1950s to 2010s = -3, -2, -1, 0, 1, 2, 3). The lack of handedness 
hassles generated by right- (versus left-) handers predicted their lower perception of handedness 
discrimination (indirect effect = -.29, 95% CI [-.47, -.14]) (Figure 8). 
 
Figure 8. Mediation model for the effect of handedness on perceived discrimination via the 
number of handedness-related hassles generated, controlling for the moderating effects of 
decade. 
 
Study 2a Hypocognition of Male Privilege: Generation of Discrimination Instances 
Studies 2a-2c extended my examination to male privilege. Study 2a conceptually 
replicated Study 1 and operationalized hypocognition as whether men were unable to generate as 
many gender discrimination instances as women. I predicted that this hypocognition would 
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mediate gender difference in awareness of male privilege and perception of gender 
discrimination.  
Procedure and Measures 
Two hundred and seventy participants (Mage = 36.53, 53.7% female, 80.4% non-Hispanic 
White) were recruited from TurkPrime, of which 145 were women and 125 were men.  
 Participants followed a similar procedure as in Study 1 and wrote down instances of 
gender discrimination experienced by women in everyday living, which were coded by two 
research assistants (κ = .96). Participants rated their awareness of male privilege (α = .84; 1 = 
strongly disagree to 6 = strongly agree) (Pinterits et al., 2009) and how much men and women 
are or were subject to discrimination in the United States from 1950s to 2010s (1 = not at all to 
10 = very much) (Norton & Sommers, 2011).  
Results 
Unless otherwise specified, I performed similar analyses as in Study 1 throughout the rest 
of the studies. 
Discrimination instances. Men generated fewer instances of gender discrimination (M = 
4.66, SE = .19) than women (M = 6.49, SE = .21), b = -.33, SE = .05, z = -6.27, p < .001.  
Privilege awareness and discrimination perception. Men were less aware of male 
privilege (M = 3.72, SE = .12) than women (M = 4.19, SE = .10), t(268) = 3.05, p = .002, d = .37. 
Men also perceived less discrimination against women (relative to men) (M = 4.10, SE = .26) 
than women (M = 4.85, SE = .24), F(1, 268) = 4.38, p = .037, ηp2 = .02. This perceptual gap held 
across decade, as indicated by a non-significant gender x decade interaction, F(1.69, 452.06) = 
.80, p = .430, ηp2 = .003.  
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Mediation. Hypocognition among men (versus women) mediated gender difference in 
acknowledging male privilege and perceiving the extent of discrimination faced by women 
(relative to men). Specifically, the lack of discrimination instances generated by men (versus 
women) predicted their lower awareness of male privilege (indirect effect = -.17, 95% CI [-.28, -
.08]) and lower perception of gender discrimination across decades (indirect effect = -.56, 95% 
CI [-.88, -.30]). 
Study 2b Hypocognition of Male Privilege: Recall of Safety Precautions 
In The Macho Paradox (Katz, 2006), educator Jackson Katz described an exercise during 
which he drew a line down the middle of a chalkboard and asked men and women to write down 
on each side the steps they take to protect themselves from assault. Whereas men stared at the 
board in silence, women readily recounted safety precautions as a part of their daily routine (e.g., 
“holding my key as a potential weapon”, “don’t go jogging at night”).  
In Study 2b, I exposed men and women to safety precaution items adapted from Katz’ 
classroom exercise and later asked them to recall as many items from the list as they could. 
Research from cognitive psychology shows that a well-established knowledge structure contains 
features representing a concept and associations among features (Barsalou, 1983). An 
impoverished knowledge structure, however, contains only fragmentary aspects of a concept 
with little association among the represented features. Thus, if men have a weaker conceptual 
grasp of male privilege as the absence of worries about assault, they will be less able to recall its 
associated instances of safety precautions compared to women. I further predict that this 
hypocognition will mediate gender gap in awareness of male privilege and gender 
discrimination.   
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Procedure and Measures  
One hundred and sixty-six participants (Mage = 36.37, 48.8% female, 77.1% non-Hispanic 
White) were recruited from TurkPrime, of which 81 were women and 85 were men. 
Participants were presented with a list of 10 safety precaution items adapted from The Macho 
Paradox (Katz, 2006) (set I: e.g., “hold one’s key as a potential weapon”; set II: e.g., “book 
flights that arrive during the day”) and 5 filler items (set I: e.g., “drink eight glasses of water per 
day”; set II: e.g., “turn off the faucet when brushing teeth”). Participants were randomly assigned 
to one of the two item sets. They rated the extent to which each action represented an example of 
how people protect themselves from being assaulted (αSafety Precaution = .84, αFiller Action = .87; 1 = 
not at all to 7 = very well).  
 Next, participants completed a two-minute numerical distraction task, counting 
backwards by 3 in writing from the number 5486. Afterwards, participants were asked to write 
down as many items as they could recall from the previous item list. The recall instruction made 
no mention of safety so as to minimize memory intrusions. Two research assistants coded the 
number of safety precautions (κ = .89) and filler actions (κ = .96) correctly recalled by each 
participant. 
As in Study 2a, participants rated their awareness of male privilege (α = .87) and how 
much men and women are or were subject to discrimination in the United States from 1950s to 
2010s.  
Results 
I performed similar analyses as in previous studies while controlling for item set in 
models involving safety precautions and filler actions. Means reported below are estimated 
marginal means averaged across item set.  
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Safety precautions. Men rated the safety precaution items to be less prototypical of 
actions people take to protect themselves from assault (M = 3.94, SE = .14) compared to women 
(M = 4.76, SE = .15), F(1, 163) = 16.15, p < .001, ηp2 = .09. There was no gender difference in 
the prototypicality ratings of filler items (Ms = 1.57 vs. 1.66), F(1, 163) = .29, p = .591, ηp2 = 
.002. 
Regarding the key measure of hypocognition, men recalled fewer safety precaution items 
(M = 3.99, SE = .22) than women (M = 4.94, SE = .25), b = -.21, SE = .07, z = -2.91, p = .004. 
There was no gender difference in the number of filler items recalled (Ms = 1.32 versus 1.30), b 
= .02, SE = .14, z = .11, p = .910. 
Privilege awareness and discrimination perception. Men were less aware of male 
privilege (M = 3.48, SE = .16) than women (M = 4.43, SE = .14), t(164) = 4.41, p < .001, d = .68. 
Men also perceived less discrimination against women (relative to men) (M = 4.30, SE = .28) 
compared to women (M = 5.55, SE = .29), F(1, 164) = 9.47, p = .002, ηp2 = .06. This perceptual 
gap widened over the decades, as indicated by a significant gender x decade interaction, 
F(1.6745, 274.62) = 7.42, p = .001, ηp2 = .04. Simple effects analyses showed that gender 
difference in perceived discrimination emerged in the 1970s and became increasingly 
pronounced throughout 2010s, bs > .97, t(164)s > 2.50, ps < .014. 
Mediation. Replicating Study 2a, hypocognition among men (versus women) mediated 
gender difference in acknowledging male privilege and perceiving the extent of discrimination 
faced by women (relative to men). Specifically, the lack of discrimination instances generated by 
men (versus women) predicted their lower awareness of male privilege (indirect effect = -.14, 
95% CI [-.29, -.02]) and lower perception of gender discrimination across decades (indirect 
effect = -.40, 95% CI [-.82, -.05]). 
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Study 2c Hypocognition of Male Privilege:  
Recall and Recognition of Discrimination Instances 
Study 2c extended the recall findings related to safety precaution to gender discrimination 
more broadly. I showed participants a TEDx talk of a transgender woman describing her 
experience from both sides of the gender divide and acknowledging the daily hassles she now 
faced as a woman. I measured hypocognition by asking participants to recall as many hassles 
mentioned in the talk as possible a day after they watched the talk. I also added a recognition 
accuracy measure as an additional index of hypocognition to examine the extent to which 
participants could distinguish instances that were actually presented in the talk from non-
presented “lures”. I predict that hypocognition, as either a lack of recall or recognition accuracy, 
will predict gender difference in attitudes related to awareness and discrimination.  
Procedure and Measures 
Two hundred and twenty-eight participants (Mage = 36.67, 41.2% female,  66.7% non-
Hispanic White) recruited from TurkPrime completed the survey at both time points. Ninety-four 
of the participants were women and 134 were men.  
Participants rated their awareness of male privilege (α = .89; 1 = strongly disagree to 6 = 
strongly agree) and how much men and women are or were subject to discrimination in the 
United States from 1950s to 2010s (1 = not at all to 10 = very much) as before. They then 
watched a TEDx talk in which a transgender woman described how her experience of everyday 
living differed from that when she was living as male. She recounted a series of daily 
inconveniences and instances of discrimination that she has encountered now living as female 
and acknowledged the male privilege she once had (Williams, 2017). 
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A day later, participants were asked to write down as many instances described in the 
TEDx talk as they could recall, which were coded by two research assistants (κ = 
.93). Participants also completed a recognition task, during which they were presented with a list 
of 11 instances mentioned in the talk (e.g., being explained things––in which they have 
knowledge––by a man) and 11 instances not described in the talk (e.g., being told to smile by a 
stranger or male colleague). Participants were asked to indicate their level of certainty regarding 
whether each instance was mentioned in the talk (1 = definitely not mentioned to 6 = definitely 
mentioned). 
Results 
Recall of discrimination instances. Men recalled fewer gender discrimination instances 
described in the TEDx talk (M = 3.06, SE = .15) than women (M = 4.06, SE = .21), b = -.28, SE = 
.07, z = -3.99, p < .001.  
Recognition of discrimination instances. I conducted a signal detection analysis to 
assess whether men were less accurate recognizing the gender discrimination instances described 
in the TEDx talk. I calculated two independent measures from signal detection theory: sensitivity 
(d’), the ability to distinguish previously mentioned instances from unmentioned foils; and 
response bias (c), the general threshold for answering “the instance was mentioned” or “the 
instance was not mentioned” (Stanislaw & Todorov, 1999).  
Men showed less sensitivity towards recognizing gender discrimination instances (M = 
1.54, SE = .08) than women (M = 1.81, SE = .09), t(226) = 2.18, p = .030, d = .29. In addition, 
women showed a lower response threshold (greater bias) for remembering discrimination 
instances as being mentioned in the talk (M = -.31, SE = .04) compared to men (M = -.17, SE = 
.04), t(226) = -2.56, p = .011, d = -.34, regardless of whether the discrimination instances were 
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actually mentioned. This finding is consistent with classic schema work demonstrating that 
greater false alarms in recognition are indications that an underlying conceptual schema is 
present and activated (Cantor & Mischel, 1977). 
Privilege awareness and discrimination perception. Men were less aware of male 
privilege (M = 3.74, SE = .12) than women (M = 4.63, SE = .14), t(226) = 4.82, p < .001, d = .65. 
Men also perceived less discrimination against women (relative to men) (M = 4.01, SE = .25) 
compared to women (M = 5.37, SE = .29), F(1, 268) = 12.73, p < .001, ηp2 = .05. This perceptual 
gap held across decade, as indicated by a non-significant gender x decade interaction, F(1.72, 
387.74) = 1.27, p = .280, ηp2 = .006. 
Mediation. I first tested whether hypocognition among men (versus women)––as 
indexed by the lack of discrimination instances recalled––mediated gender difference in 
acknowledging male privilege and perceiving the extent of discrimination faced by women 
(relative to men). Indeed, the lack of discrimination instances recalled by men (versus women) 
predicted their lower awareness of male privilege (indirect effect = -.15, 95% CI [-.28, -.04]) and 
lower perception of gender discrimination across decades (indirect effect = -.44, 95% CI [-.78, -
.17]). 
Next, I tested whether hypocognition––as indexed by the lack of recognition accuracy 
(lower sensitivity d’)––mediated gender difference in privilege awareness and discrimination 
perception. Analyses showed that the lack of accuracy in recognizing discrimination instances 
among men (versus women) predicted their lower awareness of male privilege (indirect effect = -
.07, 95% CI [-.16, -.002]) and lower perception of gender discrimination across decades (indirect 
effect = -.27, 95% CI [-.42, -.15]). Note that response bias (c) did not mediate gender difference 
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in privilege awareness (indirect effect = -.04, 95% CI [-.12, .02]) or discrimination 
perception (indirect effect = -.004, 95% CI [-.14, .13]).  
Study 3a Hypocognition of White Privilege:  
Generation of Discrimination Instances Experienced by Black Americans 
Studies 3a-3b moved from hypocognition of male privilege to that of White privilege. I 
measured hypocognition by having White and Black Americans generate (Study 3a) and recall 
from a presented list (Study 3b) instances of racial discrimination in everyday living. I 
hypothesize that White Americans will generate and recall fewer discriminatory behaviors 
compared to Black Americans, and this hypocognition will explain why they lack awareness of 
White privilege and underperceive racial discrimination.  
Procedure and Measures 
Two hundred and ninety-eight participants (Mage = 38.22, 62.1% female) recruited from 
TurkPrime, of which 154 were White and 144 were Black.  
Participants followed a similar procedure as in Studies 1 and 2a and wrote down 
instances of racial discrimination experienced by Blacks in everyday living, which were coded 
by two research assistants (κ = .93). Participants also rated their awareness of White privilege (α 
= .87; 1 = strongly disagree to 6 = strongly agree) (Pinterits et al., 2009), how much White and 
Black Americans are or were subject to discrimination in the United States from 1950s to 2010s 
(1 = not at all to 10 = very much) (Norton & Sommers, 2011). 
Results 
Discrimination instances. White Americans generated fewer instances of racial 
discrimination (M = 4.89, SE = .18) than Black Americans (M = 5.93, SE = .20), b = -.19, SE = 
.05, z = -3.86, p < .001.  
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Privilege awareness and discrimination perception. White Americans were less aware 
of White privilege (M = 4.18, SE = .11) than Black Americans (M = 5.25, SE = .07), t(296) = 
7.91, p < .001, d = .92. White Americans also perceived less discrimination against Black 
Americans (relative to White Americans) (M = 5.57, SE = .23) compared to Black Americans (M 
= 6.80, SE = .24), F(1, 296) = 13.74, p < .001, ηp2 = .04. This perceptual gap widened over the 
decades, as indicated by a significant ethnicity x decade interaction, F(1.73, 510.60) = 32.31, p < 
.001, ηp2 = .10. Simple effects analyses showed that ethnic difference in perceived discrimination 
emerged in the 1980s and became increasingly pronounced throughout 2010s, bs > .93, t(296)s > 
2.68, ps < .007. 
Mediation. Hypocognition among White Americans (versus Black Americans) mediated 
ethnic difference in acknowledging White privilege and perceiving the extent of discrimination 
faced by Black Americans (relative to White Americans). Specifically, the lack of discrimination 
instances generated by Whites (versus Blacks) predicted their lower awareness of White 
privilege (indirect effect = -.08, 95% CI [-.15, -.03]) and lower perception of racial 
discrimination across decades (indirect effect = -.30, 95% CI [-.56, -.07]). 
Study 3b Hypocognition of White Privilege:  
Recall of Discrimination Instances Experienced by Black Americans 
Procedure and Measures 
Two hundred and forty-five participants (Mage = 38.18, 60.4% female) recruited from 
TurkPrime, of which 139 were White and 106 were Black.  
Participants were presented with a list of 10 discrimination instances (set I: e.g., “being 
followed by security while shopping”; set II: e.g., “being questioned about their presence in their 
own neighborhood”) and 5 filler instances (set I: e.g., “being asked to drink eight cups of water 
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per day”; set II: e.g., “being advised to turn off the lights before leaving home”). Participants 
were randomly assigned to one of the two item sets. They rated the extent to which each instance 
represented an example of everyday racial discrimination (αDiscrimination Instance = .89, αFiller Instance = 
.75; 1 = not at all to 7 = very well).  
 Next, participants completed a two-minute numerical distraction task, counting 
backwards by 3 in writing from the number 5486. Afterwards, participants were asked to write 
down as many items as they could recall from the previous item list. The recall instruction made 
no mention of racial discrimination so as to minimize memory intrusions. Two research 
assistants coded the number of discrimination instances (κ = .93) and filler instances (κ = .95) 
correctly recalled by each participant. 
As in Study 3a, participants rated their awareness of White privilege (α = .90), how much 
White and Black Americans are or were subject to discrimination in the United States from 
1950s to 2010s. 
Results 
I performed similar analyses as in previous studies while controlling for item set in 
models involving discrimination and filler instances. Means reported below are estimated 
marginal means averaged across item set.  
Discrimination instances. White Americans rated the discrimination instances to be less 
prototypical of experiences of everyday racial discrimination (M = 3.97, SE = .14) compared to 
Black Americans (M = 4.54, SE = .16), F(1, 242) = 7.29, p = .007, ηp2 = .03. There was no ethnic 
difference in the prototypicality ratings of filler instances (Ms = 1.12 vs. 1.15), F(1, 242) = .15, p 
= .697, ηp2 < .001. 
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Regarding my key measure of hypocognition, Whites recalled fewer discrimination 
instances (M = 3.91, SE = .17) than Blacks (M = 4.58, SE = .21), b = -.16, SE = .06, z = -2.54, p 
= .011. There was no ethnic difference in the number of filler instances recalled (Ms = 1.12 
versus 1.02), b = .10, SE = .12, z = .78, p = .438. 
Privilege awareness and discrimination perception. White Americans were less aware 
of White privilege (M = 4.23, SE = .13) than Black Americans (M = 5.25, SE = .09), t(228.23) = 
6.42, p < .001, d = .77. Whites also perceived less discrimination against Blacks (relative to 
Whites) (M = 5.63, SE = .22) compared to Blacks (M = 7.00, SE = .25), F(1, 243) = 16.92, p < 
.001, ηp2 = .07. This perceptual gap widened over the decades, as indicated by a significant 
gender x decade interaction, F(1.54, 375.39) = 26.57, p < .001, ηp2 = .10. Simple effects analyses 
showed that ethnic difference in perceived discrimination emerged in the 1970s and became 
increasingly pronounced throughout 2010s, bs > .84, t(243)s > 2.76, ps < .007. 
Mediation. Replicating Study 3a, hypocognition among Whites (versus Blacks) mediated 
ethnic difference in acknowledging White privilege and perceiving the extent of discrimination 
faced by Blacks (relative to Whites). Specifically, the lack of discrimination instances recalled 
by Whites (versus Blacks) predicted their lower awareness of White privilege (indirect effect = -
.14, 95% CI [-.29, -.01]) and lower perception of racial discrimination across decades (indirect 
effect = -.23, 95% CI [-.47, -.06]). 
Study 4 Hypocognition of White Privilege:  
Generation of and Response Time Towards Discrimination Instances Experienced by 
Asian Americans 
In Study 4, I examined hypocognition of White privilege in light of the invisibility of 
discriminatory actions experienced by Asian Americans, which often include racial 
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microaggressions emphasizing their cultural foreignness (Zou & Cheryan, 2017). Worse yet, a 
certain class of microaggressions, such as microinvalidations, can mask as compliments (e.g., 
“Your English is really good!”) while nullifying one’s American identity by treating one as a 
perpetual foreigner (Sue et al., 2007). These discrimination instances can be ambiguous, fleeting, 
and difficult to disarm in the moment (Sue et al., 2019); hence, they often go unnoticed and 
unaddressed, invisible to White Americans who are not schematic of them.  
As in previous studies, I measured hypocognition by asking White Americans and Asian 
Americans to generate as many instances of racial discrimination as they could. I also assessed 
reaction time as a more implicit measure of hypocognition. White Americans may say “yes” to 
whether an instance reflects discriminatory behavior, but make such response more slowly than 
Asian Americans because they have a more impoverished idea of the content and scope of 
discrimination faced by Asian Americans. I predict that hypocognition, as indexed by either 
measure, will underlie a lack of awareness of White privilege and perception of racial 
discrimination.   
Procedure and Measures 
Two hundred and forty-ninety participants (Mage = 36.84, 62.2% female) recruited from 
TurkPrime, of which 145 were White and 104 were Asian.  
Participants followed a similar procedure as in Studies 1, 2a, and 3a and wrote down 
instances of racial discrimination experienced by Asian Americans in everyday living, which 
were coded by two research assistants (κ = .91). 
Next, participants completed a reaction time task, judging as quickly as possible whether 
they think an instance represents an example of everyday racial discrimination faced by Asian 
Americans in the U.S. by pressing the F key (yes) or the J key (no). The reaction task consisted 
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of 20 discrimination instances (e.g., being asked where they are really from) and 10 filler 
instances (e.g., being advised to turn off the lights before leaving home). Prior to the actual task, 
participants completed 16 practice questions to get used to pressing F and J keys as a way to 
agree or disagree with simple statements (e.g., “1 + 2 = 3”) as well as 4 trial questions, which 
included 2 discrimination instances and 2 filler instances different from those included in the 
actual reaction time task.  
As in previous studies, participants rated their awareness of White privilege (α = .78; 1 = 
strongly disagree to 6 = strongly agree) and how much White Americans and Asian Americans 
are or were subject to discrimination in the United States from 1950s to 2010s (1 = not at all to 
10 = very much).  
Results 
Generation of discrimination instances. White Americans generated fewer instances of 
racial discrimination (M = 4.26, SE = .17) than Asian Americans (M = 5.23, SE = .22), b = -.21, 
SE = .06, z = -3.51, p < .001.  
Reaction time for discrimination instances. All reaction time responses were natural 
log transformed to correct for skewness. White Americans and Asian Americans did not differ in 
the proportion of “yes” responses to identifying a discrimination instance as an example of 
everyday racial discrimination faced by Asian Americans (70% vs. 69%), b = -.02, SE = .23, z = 
-.08, p = .936. Nor did they differ in responding “yes” to identifying a filler instance as an 
example of racial discrimination (3% vs. 8%), b = -.89, SE = .90, z = -1.00, p = .319. In addition, 
whether participants responded “yes” or “no” did not interact with ethnic difference in reaction 
time. Therefore, in the analyses that I report below, I computed aggregated scores for reaction 
time (natural log transformed) across 20 discrimination instances (α = .97) and across 10 filler 
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instances (α = .95). I examined whether Whites and Asians differed in reaction time to 
discrimination instances while controlling for baseline reaction time to filler instances.  
White Americans reacted more slowly to discrimination instances (Mln(Reaction Time) = .57, 
SE = .02) than Asian Americans (Mln(Reaction Time) = .49, SE = .03), b = .08, SE = .04, t = 2.18, p = 
.030, after controlling for baseline reaction time for filler instances.  
Privilege awareness and discrimination perception. White Americans were less aware 
of White privilege (M = 3.88, SE = .11) than Asian Americans (M = 4.48, SE = .10), t(247) = 
3.96, p < .001, d = .51. Whites also perceived less discrimination against Asians (relative to 
Whites) (M = 4.43, SE = .21) compared to Asians (M = 5.53, SE = .25), F(1, 247) = 11.77, p < 
.001, ηp2 = .05. This perceptual gap widened over the decades, as indicated by a significant 
gender x decade interaction, F(1.85, 456.43) = 15.12, p < .001, ηp2 = .06. Simple effects analyses 
showed that ethnic difference in perceived discrimination emerged in the 1980s and became 
increasingly pronounced throughout 2010s, bs > 1.17, t(247)s > 3.28, ps < .002. 
Mediation. I first tested whether hypocognition among White Americans (versus Asian 
Americans)––as indexed by the lack of discrimination instances generated––mediated ethnic 
difference in acknowledging White privilege and perceiving the extent of discrimination faced 
by Asians (relative to Whites). Indeed, the lack of discrimination instances generated by Whites 
(versus Asians) predicted their lower awareness of White privilege (indirect effect = -.07, 95% 
CI [-.14, -.01]) and lower perception of racial discrimination across decades (indirect effect = -
.20, 95% CI [-.40, -.05]). 
Next, I tested whether hypocognition––as indexed by slower reaction time––mediated 
ethnic difference in privilege awareness and discrimination perception. I controlled for baseline 
reaction time towards filler instances as before. Analyses showed that the slower reaction 
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towards discrimination instances among Whites (versus Asians) predicted their lower awareness 
of White privilege (indirect effect = -.06, 95% CI [-.14, -.004]) and lower perception of racial 
discrimination across decades (indirect effect = -.07, 95% CI [-.09, -.06]).  
Study 5 
 Study 5 aimed to reduce hypocognition through an intervention by having participants 
listen a transgender woman describing her experience from both sides of the gender divide. I 
expect that learning about the discrimination experience and loss of male privilege from the 
perspective of a transgender woman will help ameliorate hypocognition and raise awareness of 
gender privilege and boost perception of gender discrimination.   
Procedure and Measures 
Three hundred and eleven participants (Mage = 38.93, 45.3% female,  72.3% non-Hispanic 
White) recruited from TurkPrime completed the survey at both time points. One hundred and 
forty-one of the participants were women and 170 were men.  
Participants rated their awareness of male privilege (α = .86; 1 = strongly disagree to 6 = 
strongly agree) and how much men and women are or were subject to discrimination in the 
United States from 1950s to 2010s (1 = not at all to 10 = very much) as baseline measures.  
About two weeks later, they were randomly assigned to watch one of two TEDx talks. In the 
intervention condition, participants watched a TEDx talk as in Study 2c, in which a transgender 
woman described the everyday inconveniences and discrimination she now faces living as 
female compared to the lack thereof while living as male, her former gender (Williams, 2017). In 
the control condition, participants watched a TEDx talk in which a productivity consultant 
described ways to focus one’s attention in a world of distraction (Bailey, 2019). Each original 
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video was around 15 minutes and edited to 9 minutes for the purpose of my survey to contain 
central instances and key points.  
After watching the TEDx talk, participants completed 4 comprehension checks and 4 
engagement questions (e.g., “How engaging was the TEDx talk?”, α = .81; 1 = not at all to 7 = 
very much). Afterwards, they completed the same privilege awareness (α = .87) and 
discrimination perception questions as before.  
Results 
Comprehension checks. We conducted a generalized linear model with a binomial 
distribution predicting the proportion of comprehension checks participants answered correctly 
from their gender (women = -0.5, men = +0.5), condition (control = -0.5, intervention = +0.5), 
and their interaction. A non-significant condition main effect indicated no difference in 
comprehension for the intervention and control TEDx talks (91.7% vs. 92.3%), b = -.08, SE = 
.46, z = -.18, p = .858. There was a main effect of gender, such that women answered more 
comprehension checks correctly than men (95.2% vs. 87%), b = -1.10, SE = .46, z = -2.41, p = 
.016. However, this gender difference was consistent across conditions, as indicated by a non-
significant gender x condition interaction, b = -.18, SE = .92, z = -.20, p = .841.  
Engagement checks. We subjected the aggregated engagement score to a 2 gender 
(women vs. men) x 2 condition (control vs. intervention) between-subject ANOVA. A non-
significant condition main effect indicated no difference in engagement for the intervention and 
control TEDx talks (Ms = 5.89 vs. 5.84), F(1, 307) = .13, p = .715, ηp2 < .001. There was a main 
effect of gender, such that women engaged more with the TEDx talks overall than men (Ms = 
6.11 vs. 5.62), F(1, 307) = 17.07, p < .001, ηp2 = .053. However, this gender difference was 
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consistent across conditions, as indicated by a non-significant gender x condition interaction, 
F(1, 307) = 2.64, p = .105, ηp2 = .009. 
 Effects of Intervention. To examine the effect of intervention on awareness of male 
privilege, I conducted a linear model predicting privilege awareness at Time 2 from condition 
(control = -0.5, intervention = +0.5), participant gender (women = -0.5, men = +0.5), and their 
interaction while controlling for baseline privilege awareness at Time 1. The intervention raised 
participants’ awareness of male privilege, b = .37, SE = .08, t = 4.54, p < .001. This main effect 
of intervention did not differ by participant gender, as indicated by a non-significant condition x 
gender interaction, b = -.01, SE = .16, t = -.09, p = .931. Not only did the intervention increase 
male privilege awareness for men (Ms = 3.99 vs. 4.35), but also did it increase privilege 
awareness for women (Ms = 4.16 vs. 4.54) to a similar extent.  
To examine the effect of intervention on perception of gender discrimination, I conducted 
a linear mixed model predicting perceived discrimination against women (versus men) at Time 2 
from the fixed effects of participant gender (women = -0.5, men = +0.5), condition (control = -
0.5, intervention = +0.5), decade (1950s to 2010s = -3, -2, -1, 0, 1, 2, 3), their interaction while 
controlling for baseline privilege awareness at Time 1, along with the random effect (random 
intercept) of participant. The intervention raised participants’ perception of gender 
discrimination, b = .75, SE = .19, t(303.23) = 3.92, p < .001. This intervention main effect 
became more pronounced for perceived discrimination over the decades, as indicated by a 
significant intervention x decade interaction, b = .12, SE = .03, t(1859.78) = 3.86, p < .001. 
However, the intervention main effect did not differ by participant gender, given the non-
significant condition x gender interaction, b = -.02, SE = .38, t(303.22) = -.06, p = .951. Not only 
did the intervention increase perception of gender discrimination for men across decades (Ms = 
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4.26 vs. 5.00), but also did it increase perceived discrimination for women (Ms = 4.82 vs. 5.58) 
to a similar extent (Figure 9). 
 
Figure 9. The effect of intervention (versus control) on perceived gender discrimination from 
1950s to 2010s among men and women. 
 
Discussion 
Social privileges are invisible to those who have them. In 8 studies, I show that people of 
socially dominant groups are hypocognitive of their privilege and have little idea of the daily 
hassles and discrimination experienced by subordinate groups. Right-handers generated fewer 
handedness-related hassles compared to left-handers (Study 1). Men generated fewer gender 
discrimination instances, recalled fewer items of safety precaution against assault from a 
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presented list, and showed worse recall and recognition of examples of gender discrimination 
from a video compared to women (Studies 2a to 2c). Whites generated and recalled fewer racial 
discrimination instances than non-Whites and recognized discriminatory behavior more slowly 
(Studies 3a to 4).  
In line with national reports (Menasce Horowitz et al., 2017; Oliphant, 2017) and past 
psychological research (Norton & Sommers, 2011), we demonstrated that dominant groups 
(right-handers, men, Whites) were less aware of their privilege and saw less discrimination 
aimed at disadvantaged groups compared to subordinate group members (left-handers, women, 
non-Whites), based on established measures (Norton & Sommers, 2011; Pinterits et al., 2009). 
Attitudinal chasms regarding perception of gender (Studies 2a to 2c) and racial discrimination 
(Studies 3a to 4) either persisted or became increasingly pronounced in recent decades. Across 
studies, hypocognition explained group asymmetries in recognizing social privilege and 
perceiving discrimination. Learning about the discrimination experience and loss of privilege 
from the perspective of a transgender woman helped reduce hypocognition and raise privilege 
awareness and discrimination perception (Study 5).   
 The bulk of the literature on social privilege centers on motivational defense, which 
suggests that when privilege is made visible, people react with defensiveness and “cloak” their 
privilege to assuage guilt around their privileged identities (Phillips & Lowery, 2018). They 
claim personal hardships and victimhood, emphasize hard work and individual effort, downplay 
advantages conferred to them by society, and see acts of discrimination as isolated rather than 
systemic (Phillips & Lowery, 2020; Taylor Phillips & Lowery, 2015; Unzueta & Lowery, 2008; 
Young & Sullivan, 2016). I acknowledge that people may engage in acts of willful ignorance 
once explicitly confronted with their privilege. However, my study of hypocognition provides an 
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informational approach to explaining why people from dominant groups, even with good 
intentions, fail to acknowledge their privilege in the first place. Findings show classic cognitive 
signatures (e.g., slower reaction time, worse recognition accuracy) of an impoverished schematic 
structure of handedness hassles (Study 1), burdens of self-protection (Study 2b), and 
discrimination instances (Studies 2a, 2c, 3a thru 4) among right-handers, men, and White 
Americans (Barsalou, 1983; Neisser, 1976). It is the lack of cognitive architecture to comprehend 
what their privilege entails––and the absence of discrimination associated with that privilege––
that underlie group differences in recognizing privilege and acknowledging discrimination. In 
providing an empirical demonstration of hypocognition across handedness advantage, male 
privilege, and White privilege, I provide a differing perspective to studying the invisibility of 
social privilege based on cognition rather than motivation. I further add to the literature on 
Marley hypothesis, which highlights the role of ignorance of history in denial of systemic racism, 
independent of one’s motivations (Bonam et al., 2019; Nelson et al., 2013). 
 A hypocognition approach to understanding privilege blindness also informs avenues of 
intervention to boost awareness of privilege without necessarily evoking defensive reactions. 
Research has shown that directly addressing privilege, such as telling people that they have 
privilege or asking them to “check their privilege”, often incites backlash (Phillips & Lowery, 
2020), particularly among conservatives or Whites who strongly identify with their racial 
identity (Branscombe, Schmitt, & Schiffhauer, 2007; Egan Brad, Spisz, & Tanega, 2018). Even 
when privilege checking proves to be effective in increasing discrimination perception, it works 
only for people who are already receptive to the idea. Rather than having people confront their 
privileges head on, I tested an intervention (Study 5) that allowed men and woman to peer into 
the world of a transgender woman, as she told her story of navigating everyday hassles as female 
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(e.g., being mansplained to, not being taken seriously) in contrast with her previous experience 
as male. By inviting people to experience the other side of the gender divide through the eyes of 
a transgender woman, this cognitive intervention succeeded in reducing hypocognition and 
increasing both men and women’s awareness of male privilege and perception of gender 
discrimination.  
 Although I present evidence of hypocognition among members of socially dominant 
groups, I do not imply that they face no obstacles in everyday living. Nor do I suggest that 
subordinate groups are immune to hypocognition. Each social group has its blind spot of what 
barriers other groups encounter (Davidai & Gilovich, 2016). However, the social dominance 
literature has documented that part of having social privilege as a member of the dominant group 
is to have their identity viewed as normative standard (Pratto & Stewart, 2012) and to hold more 
power in society (Fiske, 2001). As such, members of dominant groups can afford to remain 
oblivious to their group identities and the privilege associated with them, whereas members of 
subordinate groups have to be vigilant about what their identities bring and hold a realistic view 
of the discrimination present in everyday living (Wu & Dunning, 2020). Findings highlight this 
asymmetry in hypocognition and point to hypocognition as one cognitive mechanism that 
explains why gaps in privilege attitudes and discrimination perception exist.  
 Nevertheless, an interesting question arises: can subordinate groups be hypocognitive of 
their lack of privilege? In Study 5, the TEDx talk intervention not only reduced hypocognition 
among men, but also among women. Although women were more schematic of discrimination, 
more aware of male privilege, and perceive gender discrimination to a greater extent than men to 
begin with, women showed a further increase in acknowledgment of male privilege and gender 
discrimination post-intervention. In the TEDx talk, transgender woman Paula Stone Williams 
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expounded, “There is no way a well-educated white male can understand how much the culture 
is tilted in his favor… because it's all he's ever known, and all he ever will know. And 
conversely, there's no way that a woman can understand the full import of that because being a 
female is all she's ever known” (Williams, 2017). Perhaps it takes crossing the gender divide to 
fully realize one’s lack of conferred advantage and grasp its significance. It remains to be seen in 
future research how hypocognition plays out in the perception of lacking privilege among 
subordinate groups.    
In my demonstration of hypocognition, I focused on separate social identities 
(handedness, gender, race), not the intersectionality of identities. Some work has shown that 
belonging to a subordinate position on one dimension of the social hierarchy may help enhance 
perception of one’s privilege on a different dimension (Rosette & Tost, 2013). White women, for 
example, are more likely to recognize their White privilege than White men, with the exception 
of White women who have already achieved success. It will be interesting for future work to 
examine whether identity intersectionality reduces one’s hypocognition about their privileged 
identities.   
In 1959, white journalist John Howard Griffin had his skin temporarily darkened to live 
life as a black man (Griffin, 1961). He embarked on a journey through the Deep South in dark 
skin, during the time of racial segregation. He received an onslaught of scorns, hate stares, racial 
slurs, and threats from White strangers. On occasion, some Whites would offer him rides. 
However, he was astonished at how quickly they were to remark on stereotypes about Blacks and 
gush about their fantasies of a “Negro” life. After a month, Griffin could no longer stand how he 
was treated and checked into a monastery. He wrote of this haunting experience, “Hell could be 
no more lonely or hopeless.” 
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We no longer live in the age of Jim Crow, yet Griffin’s experience may retain its 
significance. Journalist and writer Andrew Solomon once wished for himself “to be young and 
middle-aged, and perhaps even very old, all at the same time—and to be dark- and fair- skinned, 
deaf and hearing, gay and straight, male and female… to exploit all of the imagination’s curious 
intricacies” (Solomon, 2015). Very few of us can traverse multiple social worlds in real life, but 
we can do so in imagination, in empathy, in listening to each other’s stories, in peering into 
unfamiliar worlds. Until then, the experiences of differing social groups will remain unknown to 
each other, and the word “privilege” will stay a nebulous construct, a vacuous expression. 
Transgender people who have gone through a gender transition are often astounded at the 
challenges faced by the other gender––now that they live visibly as that other gender––and, at 
the same time, lament the gender privileges they have now lost. Perhaps it takes the experience 
of being paralyzed by ponderous difficulties to genuinely appreciate the lives of others. Perhaps 
it takes the fortitude of Griffin’s transformation into a Black man to fully comprehend the 
hardship of living on the other side of the color line. But it surely takes a lot more than “checking 
our privilege” to grasp the privilege of our own.       
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Chapter 4 Implications and Future Directions 
 
Hypocognition confines perception, impairs memory (Chapter 2), underlies privilege 
denial, and warps discrimination perception (Chapter 3). What interventions can be developed to 
reduce hypocognition? How does hypocognition develop in the first place? In an attempt to 
reduce hypocognition, can we go too far to the other extreme (e.g., overapplying a concept to 
circumstances where it does not belong)? Below I explore theoretical and practical implications 
of hypocognition and future directions.  
Hypocognition and Public Health 
 The concept of exponential growth is often hypocognized among the minds of the lay 
public (Wagenaar & Timmers, 1979). People can easily grasp the notion of linear growth, but 
underestimate the exponential growth process and neglect the effect of compounding (M. R. 
Levy & Tasoff, 2017). In turn, they make poor financial forecasts (Stango & Zinman, 2008), 
make suboptimal retirement savings decisions (Goda, Levy, Manchester, Sojourner, & Tasoff, 
2019), and misperceive the impact of economic growth (Christandl & Fetchenhauer, 2009). It 
will be interesting to extend the implication of hypocognition to public health and test whether 
hypocognition of exponential growth contributes to the underestimation of the severity of 
pandemics such as COVID-19 (Fetzer, Hensel, Hermle, & Roth, 2020).  
Hypocognition and Sustainable Consumption 
Most people would be willing to make sustainable choices, if only they had a conception 
of what they are. Future work can explore low-cost interventions to ameliorate hypocognition of 
sustainability-related concepts by introducing cognitive frames conducive to engagement in 
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sustainable consumptive habits. For example, one pathway to mitigate climate change is through 
agricultural change by shifting away from petroleum- grown “oil-based” foods–a system which 
emits greenhouse gases and destabilizes local food markets–towards locally grown, organic 
“sun-based” foods (Lakoff, 2010). However, consumers cannot begin to recognize the ecological 
and social consequences of sustainable food consumption if they are hypocognitive of the 
conceptual distinction between sun- and oil-based foods in the first place. Future interventions 
can expose consumers to easy-to-access cognitive frameworks (e.g., distinction between “sun” 
and “oil” foods) and test whether this exposure can help increase conceptual awareness and 
propel sustainable consumption over time. 
Cultural Consciousness Despite Individual Endorsement 
 Can hypocognition of a concept affect behavior and cognition at a societal level, despite 
or in addition to individual endorsement? Many workplace diversity trainings aim to improve 
individuals’ awareness of prejudice and discrimination. However, what people think is often the 
product of their local culture.  
One emerging line of my research shows that people from societies in which the concept 
of stereotype is absent or newly introduced are more likely to commit an act of stereotyping, 
compared to people from societies familiar with the concept. This finding raises the possibility 
that susceptibility to stereotyping stems not only from individual propensity to endorse 
essentialist beliefs; it may also come from a deficiency of conceptual understanding as a product 
of one’s cultural environment.  
Development of Hypocognition 
Two kinds of people discern Jewish faces with relative accuracy: people who self-
identify as Jewish and anti-Semites (Allport & Kramer, 1946). Although this research is not 
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without controversy and methodological challenges (Tskhay & Rule, 2013), it does raise an 
intriguing question: what is the basis for developing schematicity versus hypocognition? One 
possibility is that objects and categorizations remain hypocognized unless they present an 
opportunity or a threat. In facilitating categorization of ambiguous social groups, motivations for 
either affiliation or prejudice may have to be present to aid development of schematicity in order 
to perceive facial cues. In the absence of either motive, one stays hypocognitive of such social 
categorization.  
Hypercognition 
If there are certain concepts that people cannot use in their explanations because they fail 
to have them in their cognitive arsenal, there are other likely concepts that people slide over to 
use instead. Those other concepts become the “go to” notions for people to use to make sense of 
their world. These concepts would be cognitively salient and filled with elaboration to other 
ideas. In certain cases, people may lean on them too much. They take these concepts and over-
extend their use as explanatory variables, ultimately giving these known concepts too much 
credit for producing events they witness in real world. In sum, hypocognition leads to the 
potential overuse of other concepts that are familiar and complex. 
When this happens, people engage in hypercognition. A hypercognitive concept is salient 
and woven extensively, perhaps too much, into people’s explanatory schemes of objects and 
events (Levy, 1973). For example, Westerners might be hypercognitive about self-esteem. Not 
only is it a culturally-central concept, but much is attributed to it. People claim that high self-
esteem is the key for better performance, success, happiness, and health, whereas low self-
esteem is responsible for violence, cheating, delinquency, prejudice, and other social ills. Actual 
data, however, suggest that the relationship between self-esteem and such outcomes is more 
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meager and complex. Although high self-esteem may be consistently related to reports of 
happiness, its link to the other supposed consequences is difficult to establish empirically 
(Baumeister, Campbell, Krueger, & Vohs, 2003). Its use as an explanatory variable is 
overextended. 
Déformation Professionelle  
Experts and professionals may experience their own peculiar form of hypercognition.  
When interpreting a situation, they may overuse the constricted set of concepts salient in their 
own profession while neglecting a broader array of equally valid concepts, a phenomenon known 
as déformation professionnelle (Warnotte, 1937). Consider a factory where the workers are no 
longer as productive as they used to be. Where an economist may see a problem with an 
incentive structure and a psychologist instead a problem in self-identification with work, a 
sociologist might see a breakdown in social norms. 
Medical research, too, provides demonstrations of déformation professionnelle. Doctors 
readily interpret a patient’s illness to terms of their own specialty. Cardiologists are more likely 
to diagnose a case as heart disease than their peers specializing in infectious disease. Infectious 
disease specialists are more likely diagnose a case as an infection than will their compatriots in 
hematology or gastroenterology. Non-specialists were the best diagnosticians of all. As such, it 
appears that doctors diagnose what they know. What they do not know because of specialization 
may lead to preventable errors at the time of diagnosis (Hashem, Chi, & Friedman, 2003).  
In a similar vein, psychiatric clinicians over-diagnose depression, relative to a standard 
assessment instrument, whereas primary care physicians under-diagnose (Schulberg, 1985). 
Patients are not free from hypercognition themselves. Those hypercognitive of “winter blues” 
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suffer from seasonal affective disorder (SAD) at an outsized rate (Rosenthal, 1984), despite 
mixed evidence of whether SAD exists (Traffanstedt, Mehta, & LoBello, 2016).  
Can Hypocognition Be Motivated? 
So far, I have discussed hypocognition as a purely cognitive phenomenon, but could it be 
born out of motivated, purposeful intentions? A frequently overlooked part of Robert Levy’s 
treatise on Tahitians is why Tahitians suffered from a hypocognition of grief (R. I. Levy, 1984). 
As it turns out, Tahitians did have a private inkling of grief. However, the community 
deliberately kept the public knowledge of the emotion hypocognitive to suppress its expression. 
Hypocognition was used as a form of social control, a wily tactic to expressly dispel unwanted 
concepts by never elaborating on them. After all, how can you feel something that doesn’t exist 
in the first place?  
Intentional hypocognition can serve as a powerful means of information control. Chinese 
rebel writer Han Han once recounted that any of his writings containing the words “government” 
or “communist” would be censored by the Chinese Internet police (CNN, 2010). Ironically, 
efforts of censorship also muffled an abundance of praise from pro-leadership blogs. An effusive 
commendation such as “Long live the government!” would, too, be censored for the mere 
mention of “government”.   
But a closer look reveals the furtive workings of hypocognition. Rather than rebuking 
negative remarks and rewarding praises, the government blocks access to any related discussion 
all together, rendering any conceptual understanding of politically sensitive information 
impoverished in the public consciousness. “They don’t want people discussing events. They 
simply pretend nothing happened… That’s their goal,” Han Han pondered. Regulating what is 
 78 
said is more difficult than ensuring nothing is said. The peril of silence is not a suffocation of 
ideas. It is to engender a state of blithe apathy in which no idea is formed.  
Nevertheless, I’d like to think that the attempt at hypocognizing a concept can often 
propel a more urgent need for its expression. The emergence of a unifying language of #MeToo 
gives voice to those who were compelled into silence. The materialization of a new gender 
glossary lends credence to the existence of those whose identity departs from the rigid binaries of 
man and woman (“Redefining gender,” 2017). Ideas and categories that are yet to be 
conceptualized leave open aspirational possibilities for future progress. Every now and then, a 
new term will bubble up; a new concept will burst forth––to give meaning to walks of life 
previously starved of recognition, to instill life into our inchoate impulses, to tell the stories that 
need to be told.  
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Appendix A: Novel Concepts  
 
Baader-Meinhof phenomenon: the phenomenon in which people who are just introduced to a 
phenomenon, word, person, or object start seeing it more frequently than before 
Bangst: stress over diminishing funds 
Benevolent sexism: a chivalrous attitude that appears favorable towards women but is actually 
sexist, because it views women as pure or weak creatures in need of men's protection 
Civil inattention: the phenomenon in which strangers who are in close proximity demonstrate 
that they are aware of one another, without imposing on each other 
Dunning-Kruger effect: a cognitive bias in which the incompetent do not have the ability to 
recognize their own ineptitude 
Egosurf: boost one’s ego by searching for one’s own name on Google or other search engines 
Figital: excessively checking one’s digital device 
Geobrag: post repeated status updates on social media noting one's location in an attempt to gain 
attention from others and boost one’s status 
Imposter syndrome: a phenomenon in which people fear being found out as incompetent, 
despite overwhelming evidence of their high abilities. Imposter syndrome can happen to men and 
women in various professions. 
Indirect speech act: a phenomenon in which when people speak, they veil their intentions in 
innuendo, euphemism, or doublespeak instead of blurting something out explicitly 
Pareidolia: a phenomenon in which people see patterns or faces in random objects (e.g., clouds, 
shadows) 
Perserveerance: procrastination via performing other tasks 
Precrastination: the tendency to complete tasks as soon as possible; the opposite of 
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procrastination 
Semantic satiation: a phenomenon in which when a word or phrase is repeated over and over 
again, it temporarily loses its meaning for the listener 
Shoeburyness: the vague uncomfortable feeling of sitting in a seat that is still warm from 
someone else's bottom 
Shoverdose: binge-watch a TV series 
Sillage: the scent that lingers in the air, such as the trace of someone's perfume or cologne 
Uptalk: a way of speaking that ends declarative sentences with rising sounds as if one is asking a 
question 
Vaguebooking: an intentionally vague status update on social media such as Facebook that 
prompts friends to ask what is going on 
Vocal fry: speaking in a creaky voice with glottal vibrations 
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